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Preface 
 
The events on 22nd of July 2011 affected most Norwegians, myself included. Through media 
broadcast, I soon learned that the terrorist Anders Behring Breivik and his motives were 
highly complex, and that the legal system had trouble settling down on a conclusion. When I 
read about and saw how forensic psychiatry struggled to provide the court with clear answers 
on his accountability status, I was for the first time curious about their procedures. As a 
sociologist and inquisitive person, I often wonder about phenomena that are commonly taken 
for granted. Consequently, this inspired me to discover more about this expert system.  
I considered the topic very important, because it complicated important principles in 
Norwegian society such as legal security, and because the case challenged our conception of 
accountability. Through the study, I reached the goal of learning more about these issues, 
which has left me with more questions to address in the future.  
I want to thank my parents Eli and Michael, as well as my better half Kristina, for support, 
inspiration and constructive feedback from beginning to end. This has been an exciting, 
enlightening and rewarding learning experience for us all! I would also like to thank my 
supervisor Håkon Leiulfsrud for his hard-hitting and accurate advice, which forced me to 
remain focused throughout the study. 
 
Sean E. L. Boatwright 
Trondheim, 17th of January 2014 
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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate and identify possible professional dilemmas facing 
forensic psychiatry in the context of the Breivik-trial and the aftermath, to determine whether 
mental evaluations are given too much weight in court decisions.  A contextual framework is 
provided, as well as the theoretical frame of reference, which relies mainly on theorists 
associated with sociology of knowledge, such as Foucault and Bourdieu. Their definitions of 
power, prestige, discourse and legitimacy are a central inspiration for my interpretation, and 
communicative aspects are compared to the thoughts of Habermas, Kompridis, Mercier and 
Sperber.  
I used qualitative content analysis as my methodological approach, to examine various 
sources from the public debate. The main findings suggested that forensic psychiatry is 
antiquated, illegitimate and invalid. Evidence showed that mental evaluations un-
proportionately affect court decisions, and acts of symbolic violence were detected in these, as 
well as within professional power struggles against opposing disciplines. Public trust in 
experts declined because of the power struggles, and the expert system of psychiatry was 
portrayed as inadequate and untrustworthy. According to evidence, psychiatric language is 
intertwined with the principle of medicine and related laws that guarantee their position in the 
judicial system. Legislation and the principle will likely be changed, and the court will be 
assisted by a broader academic competence in the future.  
The study has shed light on the lack of transparency in the expert system of psychiatry, and it 
thus defies the principles of an open democratic society. The media, public and alternative 
fields of expertise were highly influential for the appointment of specialists, the outcome of 
the court trial, and for staging the necessary scrutiny and criticism of psychiatry. This would 
not have been possible without extensive media coverage. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
In two sequential cold-blooded attacks on the 22nd of July 2011, the terrorist Anders Behring 
Breivik targeted the Norwegian government, the civilian population and the Labour Party’s 
Youth League (AUF). On forehand he made his manifesto available to the public and claimed 
that his actions were the first steps towards what he termed “a holy war against Islam and the 
Cultural Marxists” (Vikås 2011; Breivik 2011). By using a bomb, a pistol and a semi-
automatic rifle, he killed 77 people – and left hundreds injured. The police special unit finally 
arrested him, and he was since charged with both attacks (NTB 2012; Nørve 2012).  
The devastating terrorist attacks caught the eye of the international media, and it took most 
people by surprise that this incident could occur in an otherwise peaceful and democratic 
country like Norway. Furthermore, many people condemned the police’s late response to the 
crime scene and the lack of overall organization in a crisis mode. The events on the 22nd of 
July thus became the deadliest attacks on Norwegian soil since the Second World War 
(Feldman 2012). Soon to follow was the preparation for a lengthy and fatiguing court-trial, 
where Breivik’s mental health was analysed by forensic psychiatrists to establish if he was 
accountable for his actions.  
According to §20 in the Criminal Code (Straffeloven 2005 [§44 1902]), a perpetrator cannot 
be punished if they fit the criteria of psychosis when a crime is committed, a conclusion that 
is based on the Principle of Medicine. The judicial system was criticized for requesting 
specialist assistance primarily from psychiatrists and not psychologists to assess Breivik’s 
mental health. Psychologist Anne-Kari Torgalsbøen (2012) pointed out that the field of 
psychiatry has long been engaged in a professional power struggle, and that the judges are 
biased in their decisions. She claims that “inhability concerns” with the psychologists was 
only a diversion for appointing psychiatrists in the court trial, and that the judiciary generally 
shows little interest in achieving a broad academic competence, when it could have benefitted 
from it.   
The initial expert evaluation was thus conducted by two psychiatrists, and they claimed 
Breivik was psychotic (Brenna et al. 2013). This was seconded by the Commission for 
Forensic Medicine (DRK) – whose function is to quality assure the evaluations. The report 
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was leaked to the press, and it resulted in a media storm of great magnitude. The profession of 
forensic psychiatry became the centre focus of a critical debate that scrutinised the validity of 
expert work, and which suggested that there was a discrepancy between the outcome of the 
report and the public expectations of how to punish the perpetrator.  
Soon after, media headlines such as “129 terror victims demand a new Breivik-evaluation” 
indicated a public need for a revaluation (Utheim et al. 2012). Many did not understand how 
the experts could deem him insane, when he planned the attacks down to the smallest detail, 
and acted upon his plans with the greatest calm. Through pressure from the media and counsel 
for the aggrieved party, the court eventually decided to call in two new expert psychiatrists to 
revaluate his mental health. In the second report, they concluded that he was not psychotic and 
was fit to plead, although DRK did not approve it (Brenna et al. 2013; Dagbladet 2012). 
Nonetheless, both reports became the prosecution and judge’s basis for assessing Breivik, and 
he was finally considered accountable for his actions and sentenced to 21 years preventive 
detention (Buan & Gran 2012; Lewis & Lyall, 2012). 
The outcome of the forensic psychiatrists’ two very different conclusions sparked a 
nationwide discussion. During and after the trial, the media created several headlines with 
hard-hitting words such as “The Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine has serious trust 
issues” and “Half of Norway has lost its confidence in forensic psychiatry”. Via the media-
storm, many questions were asked: For instance, what is the worth of expert opinions; why 
were there no psychologists involved, and do forensic psychiatrists have too much power in 
court decisions (Svendsen, Mostue & Ertesvåg 2012; Buan & Gran 2012; Hultgren, Foss & 
Gedde-Dahl 2012)? 
 
1.1 Critical hindsight  
Two and a half years later, forensic psychiatry is still criticised in connection with the 
Breivik-case and more recent news such as the Sigrid-case and the Halloween-murders (Skille 
2013; Hanssen 2013). Even though forensic psychiatry is currently in a defensive position, to 
criticise it is by no means a new phenomenon. The public has discussed the forensic 
psychiatric observations of author and Nazi-sympathizer Knut Hamsun for 60 years, since he 
was institutionalized in 1945 (Krokfjord 2012; Skålevåg 2005). In contrast, most court cases 
are simple by nature, and handled by jurists, who assess the perpetrators and their crime, by 
interpreting the criminal code to determine a fitting punishment. However, forensic 
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psychiatrists can be appointed to advise them on accountability issues when the perpetrator 
and crime is complex, like the particularly challenging case of Breivik. 
The necessity to involve psychiatry in court is confirmed by both legislation and Norwegian 
Official Reports (NOUs), but many reckon what the principle of medicine is based on can be 
problematized (Strpl. 1981; Hlspl. 1999; NOU 2001: 12). The principle states a perpetrator 
shall not be punished if considered psychotic when he or she commits a crime. Psychiatric 
evaluations based on this principle are in addition considered to reduce the autonomy of the 
court, and the principle itself causes indemnity for repeat offenders who are not active 
psychotics. Norway is one of few countries that work out of this principle, and it is seen as an 
obstacle to partake in a morally just court proceeding. One alternative is the principle of 
psychology, which has been successfully adopted by courts in for instance Sweden and 
Denmark. This entails to detect whether psychosis possibly led directly to commit the 
criminal act, and as such provides an entirely different scope for evaluating the psyche of a 
perpetrator (Hirsti & Falch-Nilsen 2012; Auestad, Nilssen & Omland 2012).  
The quality of the two different mental evaluations in the Breivik-case was markedly 
different, and the various expert and public remarks that were voiced through media suggest 
an uncertainty about whether forensic psychiatry should have the monopoly on assessing the 
health of “criminal minds”. In connection with the Breivik-scenario, input from for instance 
political science, theology, neuroscience and sociology shed further light on the perpetrator 
and the criminal act. The public debate itself led to a revaluation that appears to have 
challenged the status and legitimacy of forensic psychiatry. Psychologist Gry Stålsett (cited in 
Helmikstøl 2012: 475) stated that Breivik is an extreme exponent of tendencies in the 
Norwegian culture, and that we may not be able to analyse him fully, as we do not yet have a 
language that accommodates the existential. 
DRK was criticised for being incompetent, both in legal and professional terms, and the same 
criticism fell on the two psychiatrists that conducted the first evaluation (Færaas 2012). The 
procedures of the second evaluation showed a will to adapt to and incorporate ideas from 
other professional fields. Representatives from SIFER, the competence centre for research and 
education in forensic psychiatry and psychology, claim that much of the criticism derived 
from the debate after 22nd of July has largely pinpointed issues that directly relate to political 
dilemmas and resource allocation. In their opinion, the professional fields themselves have 
desired an improvement of contemporary forensic psychiatric work for years. They blame the 
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media for using words such as “crisis” and directed verbal assaults towards psychiatrists 
instead of the politicians (Fleiner 2012). 
In sum, there were conflicts of interest between actors on different levels, and the public 
debate took a huge toll on the legitimacy of forensic psychiatry. Breivik and his crimes were 
considered so complex that it was problematic to place him into categories (Hanssen 2013). 
Yet, the forensic psychiatrists placed him into categories and he was consequently sentenced 
by the judge. In light of the 2011 Norway attacks, the dichotomous nature of forensic 
psychiatry and the laws and principles it is founded on, seems more arbitrary than accurate – 
and the predicaments of its current state may even defy logic in the legal sense. It remains 
unclear how and if forensic psychiatry will change their procedures and framework to 
accommodate this. Is the case of Breivik simply the story of a “lone wolf” who falls between 
two stools, or is the case the embodiment of severe flaws in our whole government system? 
Should the court be assisted by a broader academic competence, and whom should the public 
trust? These have been frequent questions in the public discourse. 
Clearly, appointed forensic psychiatrists are in a crucial position within government, because 
they represent how our society views normality and deviance, and their knowledge affects 
court decisions. The aim of this study is hence to explore professional dilemmas facing 
forensic psychiatry in the context of the Breivik-trial and the aftermath. I am here particularly 
interested in the weight given to the professional evaluations made by appointed forensic 
psychiatrists in the realm of the Norwegian justice system. To gather evidence for this, I work 
by the research question: How has forensic psychiatry been criticized? 
 
1.2 Outline 
I am inspired by theories that focus upon professional discourses, expert knowledge and 
argumentation, including work by Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Jürgen Habermas, 
Nikolas Kompridis, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber. I frequently refer to theoretical concepts 
such as field, discourse and system, as well as knowledge, expert and expertise. This will be 
elaborated in chapter 2. My approach is methodologically exploratory, in line with my focus 
upon professional dilemmas that face forensic psychiatry in the context of the legal system. I 
use qualitative content analysis. 
The empirical data is selected in order to highlight aspects that relate directly to dilemmas 
facing forensic psychiatry and the Breivik-trial. This includes, but is not restricted to, 
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statements from people holding key positions relevant to their professions, such as psychiatry, 
psychology and the court system. Some data obtained from mainstream media sources 
represents prevailing currents of thought within the civil population. This is considered 
relevant, as the “civil discourse” had a significant impact on the trial after the first psychiatric 
report was leaked to the press. My methodological approach is described in chapter 3. In 
chapter 4, I present the analysis and highlight the main findings related to my thesis. These 
will be discussed in light of the theory in chapter 5. Conclusively, chapter 6 contains a brief 
summary, as well as thoughts on the relevance of future research on related topics and places 
this study into a broader sociological context. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical and conceptual framework 
 
Sociology of knowledge has traditionally dealt with uncovering the potentially misleading 
aspects of our thoughts about the world. Karl Mannheim (1934) was a prominent contributor 
to this field, but due to the dominance of functionalism through the middle years of the 20th 
century, the sociology of knowledge largely remained on the periphery of mainstream 
sociological thought. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966) built their concepts in The 
Social Construction of Reality based on Mannheim’s legacy. They were accredited of “re-
inventing” and applying the concept more closely to everyday life, and their ideas are still 
influential. 
Inspired by the revival, a “new” sociology of knowledge has emerged. According to Swidler 
and Arditi (1995: 306), it now began to focus on how kinds of social organization made whole 
orderings of knowledge possible, rather than being based on social locations and interests of 
individuals or groups. They claim that newer work in sociology and cultural studies suggests 
that formal systems of ideas are linked to broader cultural patterns – as we might think of as 
“social consciousness”. Swidler and Arditi claim that the layperson is not only shaped by 
knowledge specialists, but also by structures of knowledge. This can be seen in relation to the 
following quote by Mannheim (1936: 3): 
“Strictly speaking it is incorrect to say that the single individual thinks. Rather it is 
more correct to insist that he participates in thinking further what other men have 
thought before him. He finds himself in an inherited situation with patterns of thought 
which are appropriate to this situation and attempts to elaborate further the inherited 
modes of response or to substitute others for them in order to deal more adequately 
with the new challenges which have arisen out of the shifts and changes in his 
situation.” 
Forensic psychiatrists and clinical psychologists are considered expert witnesses in the 
Norwegian court of law. They are expected to fulfil certain roles, perform a set of duties and 
live up to (public) expectations. The terms expert and expertise have a range of connotations, 
both in science and everyday life. The common-sense definition of expert is based on the 
assumption that he or she has a long formal education and many years of practical experience, 
where theoretic knowledge and learning from work has led to acquiring unique skills. 
Expertise can be defined as high-level and longstanding performances within a field of 
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specialty, which is a result of personal attributes and not coincidences or luck (Madsen 1999: 
1).  
In the standard sociological interpretation expertise is often associated with unique 
skills/assets (Wright 1985), or professional associations based upon the idea of closure in 
order to reduce competition (Weber [1919]1946; Parkin 1974). Weberian theory also focuses 
upon how experts deploy strategies to protect the self-interests in order to legitimize and 
sustain their work in society. The experts make sure that their esoteric knowledge and 
specialized skills are employed tactically to ensure control over professional skills, economic 
benefits and to maintain status and power. This sociological contribution focuses largely on 
external and socially attributed factors regarding expertise and experts (Madsen 1999: 1).  
When it comes to research problem solving and applied expertise, psychology and cognitive 
studies have devoted much to this field. It is generally believed that experts, who have 
longstanding experience and a heavy theoretical backbone, have a much higher success rate 
than novices. On the other hand, if an expert relies too heavily on his or her job-specific 
schema, it can be hard to adapt and respond to unknown or unfamiliar situations. This can be 
seen as an undesired effect linked to the concept automation of knowledge. A similar 
phenomenon is simplification, where complex situations are interpreted as simpler than what 
they are – which can lead to dangerous misunderstandings and errors, and eventually a limited 
application of knowledge. Finally, relying too deeply on context-based procedures inhibits an 
expert’s ability to realize when his or her expertise is not sufficient or in need of adjustment. 
In such cases, the expert becomes “a one trick pony” (Madsen 1999: 2-3). 
Knowledge and expertise is intimately linked to issues of power and legitimisation. This is 
also, despite differences, a common thread for Foucault, Bourdieu, Habermas, Kompridis, 
Mercier and Sperber in their approach to knowledge and expertise. In their research, they 
apply various concepts such as field, symbolic violence, habitus, discourse, rationality, 
reflective disclosure and confirmation bias. These terms are not interchangeable, but the 
context in which they are applied is transmissible to understand the complexity of the Breivik-
scenario. The case and its aftermath reveals several professional dilemmas, like how the 
presence of experts and applied expertise in court is considered problematic, and how laws 
related to the principle of medicine complicate matters of establishing guilt or diagnosis. How 
society defines madness in relation to the question of guilt can also be linked to this setting, as 
well as professional power struggles between psychiatry and psychology. The empirical data 
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presented in this study thus portrays discourses through its content, as evidence for 
professional dilemmas and underlying themes of conflict within expert systems, as regards 
knowledge, power, prestige and legitimacy.  
 
2.1 Knowledge and expertise in professional power struggles 
Foucault (1991) describes power as being everywhere in a constant communication of 
knowledge. For him, knowledge does not equal power, but mechanisms of power produce 
different types of knowledge. In this viewpoint truth, morality and meaning is created through 
discourse. His research indicates that whichever institutions produce the knowledge and 
language that governs a given discourse, is likely to be in a dominating position within the 
social body. To understand the contemporary institutions of law and medicine as expert 
systems, he examines the discursive traces and orders left by the past in an archaeological 
approach.  
Foucault (1991) argues that certain institutions prevent non-professionals from gaining access 
to specific knowledge, thereby effectively freezing particular relations of power so that a 
certain number of people are at a disadvantage. This argument is applicable to the alleged 
power struggle between psychiatry and psychology, where they dispute their influence in 
court. Perhaps because of the “stalemate”, Norwegian court has abided the principle of 
medicine since 1842. However, the Breivik-case has induced much negative publicity and 
criticism of psychiatry, and many desire to replace the existing framework with the principle 
of psychology. Psychiatric expertise is for instance considered old-fashioned and views 
presented through the public debate has favoured a “regime change” (NOU 2001: 12, 
Helmikstøl 2012). 
Bourdieu (1988: 65) explains that the scope provided for everything contributing to the social 
cohesion of scholars within the academic faculties is designed to ensure the durable 
homogeneity of the habitus, and tends to increase as we move from physicists and 
mathematicians, to clinical practitioners and jurists. According to him, this is no doubt 
because of the need to ground in the social unity of the group, where the intellectual unity of 
the communis opinio doctorum (scientific consensus) is all the more pressing when their 
specifically academic coherence is more uncertain and when the social responsibility of the 
body is greater. Bourdieu (1988: 65) argues particularly, that in the case of jurists, a body of 
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“authorities” cannot present itself in a state of disarray, as intellectuals may, without 
compromising its capital of authority:  
“Just as it must erase from its ‘written judgement’ the contradictions which are the 
visible traces of the very conflicts that gave rise to it, and the questions which might 
allow its true functions to be discovered, it must make a pre-emptive dismissal of all 
those who could threaten the order of the body of the guardians of order” 
In this perspective, it makes sense that the structure of “the body of the guardians of order” 
has remained largely conservative through the years, and that the extensive negative attention 
towards forensic psychiatry after July 22nd compromised the legitimacy of the institution. In a 
Foucauldian view, the accessibility for non-professionals to learn about and criticise the 
language of psychiatry, can be seen as an increased threat to its legitimacy (given that the 
field of psychiatry practice closure as a way to maintain their power relations within court). 
Bourdieu (1988) speaks of the importance to preserve the scientific consensus. If forensic 
psychiatry currently finds itself in a “crisis”, a Bourdieuian view could explain that its 
representatives are now forced to retain homogeneity and unity in order to withstand the 
crisis.  
 
2.2 Normative validity: Views on mental illness 
Foucault’s (1991) studies into the depths of madness have attempted to look beyond the 
institutional ideologies of psychiatry for the conditions of their possibilities. Foucault (1991: 
17) quotes Blaise Pascal and Fyodor M. Dostojevskij: 
“Men are so necessarily mad, that not to be mad would amount to another form of 
madness.” - Pascal  
“It is not by locking up one’s neighbour that one convinces oneself of one’s own good 
sense.” - Dostojevskij 
These quotes depict a view on normality and society that question the way we categorise and 
separate the mad from the normal, but according to which logic does madness exists, and in 
which language is it spoken? Foucault (1991) speaks of society as a social body, where the 
discourse is the main vehicle in which power is asserted throughout the various institutions. 
He links this closely to the social production of knowledge, where knowledge-ownership 
enables an uneven distribution of power. He maintains that this power is not “contained”, but 
is constantly flowing within the discourse. One example is how he sees psychiatry as the 
institution responsible for creating the language of mental illness – where the voices of the 
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mad are not heard. In his viewpoint, psychiatry enforces their definitions of normality and 
reinforces their legitimacy by constantly repressing the discourse of the mad. This suggests 
that the psychiatric discourse is opinionated, and potentially invalid in the sense that the 
knowledge it produces is one-sided. 
Foucault (1991: 17-18) talks about a point in time when “madness” as a concept was first 
invented. In order to find the origin, he expresses the need to lose all the “truths” we have 
learned on the way. Foucault states that the language and the terms of science and 
psychopathology must not play a key role in investigating the matter – but rather the actions 
that separate madness from saneness. In a metaphoric train-of-thought, he explains that there 
was a constant battle between reason and non-reason in the first division process. In the 
centre, he explains there was a void that marked the position from which the sane and insane 
moved away from each other. In Foucault’s words, both domains communicated about the 
splitting in a crude and archaic language. In this context, the people that “belong” to each 
category were mutually connected and depending on each other, quite unlike how the mad are 
currently institutionalised and separated from the normal. 
Foucault (1991: 17) argues that in the calm world of the mentally ill the modern citizen does 
not communicate with the insane; he points out that the insane person is left with the doctor 
by the reasonable men and women. According to him, this enables a one-sided relationship 
through the abstract universality of the disease. Moreover, Foucault sees the insane person’s 
communication with their surroundings as solely conveyed by a reason that is just as abstract 
for them – order, physical and moral compulsion, anonymous group pressure and conformity 
demands. In this perspective, language plays a key part as a domination-technique of 
exploitation and misleading. 
According to Foucault (1991: 18), a common language for reason and madness has not 
existed since psychiatry established insanity as a disease of the mind at the end of the 18th 
century. He explains that this marked the point where the dialogue stopped and where the 
separation between the two was complete. According to him, all the stammering and 
incomplete words without a set syntax, which represented the unity between both domains, 
were forgotten. Foucault affirms that the language of psychiatry, which is reason’s monologue 
over insanity, can only exist based on the forgotten and the silenced. With these 
communicative aspects in the back of the mind, it makes you wonder in what direction the 
views on madness could take if psychiatry’s know-how was challenged. Furthermore, 
Foucault’s historical setting puts psychiatry into perspective, and brings about questions on 
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the validity of psychiatric work – as it has largely remained uncontested for over two hundred 
years.  
 
2.3 Psychiatry’s relationship with the justice system 
Foucault (1991: 48) tells the dark story of how psychiatry began its relationship with the 
justice system, and he dates it back to the emergence of what he terms the Classical Age of 
the 17th and 18th century. He calls this “The Great Imprisonment”, and refers to how 
enormous institutions were erected, much like prisons or concentration camps. He explains 
that during these times, the autocracy made sure the mad, poor, unemployed, criminals and 
“similar” were rounded up and confined within four walls. He argues that year 1656 serves as 
a milestone in history, when Hôpital Général was opened in Paris. He describes how the 
administrative reform led to a centralization of power to the directors in charge of the 
hospital, its affiliated institutions and the city of Paris. At this point, he claims the fate of any 
person, of any sex, of any age and with any physical, social or mental condition considered 
unfitting, was in the hands of the director. According to Foucault, the director’s duty was to 
punish, administer, police, rule and trade. He describes this as a central event where medicinal 
institutions became half-judiciary systems, with autonomy so great it could be considered 
micro-societies within society. Consistent with this, he explains that medicinal institutions 
became a submission-authority for social deviators and mad people, which maintained order 
in society together with the police and the king. 
Towards the 18th century, similar tendencies had spread all across Europe. Foucault (1991: 
50-51) contends that the church played a central part too as a fierce competitor for power over 
the government, but also for cooperating with the government to treat the mad. He refers to 
one point in time, where as many as 6000 people in Paris (1% of the population) were arrested 
and confined within the jurisdiction of medicinal and quasi-medicinal institutions. In the 
midst of all the madness of mass-incarceration, it brings about the question of the meaning of 
it all. In line with Foucault’s research, the Zeitgeist of the Classical Age encouraged a 
seemingly perverse way of defining who should be locked away. The phenomenon could be 
seen as a response to a public need to deal with poverty, economic problems, unemployment 
and vagrancy, but foremost as a moral obligation. The same needs are also topical today. 
Foucault (1991: 52-53) explains how the treatment of deviant behaviour thus gives an 
indication of how madness was experienced and perceived in Europe, and how it coloured the 
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culture of that time. It also shows how the science of medicine and psychiatry started to play a 
central part in government. While contemporary psychiatry is not by far as autonomous as it 
used to be, it is still debateable whether forensic psychiatrists today have more influence than 
what we think and what is necessary. The wrongdoings in history can be criticised, but many 
aspects of psychiatry has remained the same.   
The Norwegian approach to address issues of psychosis in relation to criminal acts puts a lot 
of pressure on forensic psychiatrist – while it gives them a lot of power. The outcome of the 
forensic psychiatric evaluations affects court decision, and this ultimately affects the fate of 
the perpetrators – in terms of punishment by regular imprisonment or admission to 
compulsory treatment in medicinal institutions. If the principle of psychology is implemented, 
to diagnose psychosis will not be a central concern for court cases, inasmuch as it may not be 
linked to factors that motivate the criminal act itself. In other words, when issues of 
accountability become subsidiary, the perpetrator’s self-insight and ability to act on “free 
will” becomes a primary issue. 
There are no formal requirements for specialized competence in order to partake in a full 
forensic psychiatric evaluation, and two psychiatrists are usually appointed. However, on rare 
occasions one assistant doctor or specialist in clinical psychology will assist one psychiatrist. 
Generally, the education of psychiatrists does not include much teaching on specific forensic 
psychiatric work, but to learn how to determine if a person is insane is central. Forensic 
psychiatric work cannot be quality assured in the same way as laboratory-medicine, but a 
chief concern is to ensure that it follows certain formalities, as for instance to commence 
certain amounts of conversations with the subject, use standardised instruments of measure 
and document by protocol (NOU 2001: 12). Until recently, there has been no formal 
professional unit devoted to training people specifically in the work required by the court, 
even though there was much public demand. Former Minister of Justice Grete Faremo (cited 
in Torset 2013), announced that a pilot project has been initiated in Trondheim, and will be 
fully operational by 2014.  
The actual psychic evaluation produced by an appointed forensic psychiatrist will be quality 
assured by DRK, as stated by the code of criminal procedure (Straffeprosessloven §146, 
§147,). The board and the court receive the same written statement from the appointed 
specialist regarding the evaluation. If the verbal statements given in court differ from the 
documents, the specialist is obliged to send the board a summary of the verbal explanation. 
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DRK is obliged to inform the court if there are any substantial shortcomings of the appointed 
specialist work.  
 
2.4 Symbolic violence 
Bourdieu’s (1988) work is among other things devoted to understand the social mechanism 
and power relations within academia and elite positions in society. For him, symbolic capital 
is the crucial source of power – and if a holder of symbolic capital uses his or her power 
against agents who holds less capital in order to change their actions, this is referred to as 
symbolic violence. Forensic psychiatry’s major influence in court decisions is by some 
considered symbolic violence against both the court and clinical psychology, and is even 
considered an obstacle to a holistic understanding of criminal deviance. Bourdieu’s views are 
thus important to analyse power struggles within the legal system, and how psychiatry 
reproduces its social standing and balance. 
As clinical medicine and its sciences serve as a unifier between interests of the nation and the 
social rationale legitimizing its structures, it is according to Bourdieu (1988: 63-64) possible 
to show in the same logic that the very exercise of the clinical act implies a form of symbolic 
violence. He sees clinical competence as a system of patterns of perception, which are 
codified to varying degrees – and more or less completely personified by their medical agents. 
According to Bourdieu, this competence cannot function practically, if it is analogous from 
the act of jurisprudence for the judge, with the exception of relying on indices from the 
patients, bodily indices and verbal indices – which for the most part have to be solicited by 
clinical enquiry.  
Bourdieu (1988: 64) exclaims that we find a dissymmetrical social relation in the enquiry 
process, where the expert is able to impose his own cognitive presuppositions on the indices 
delivered by his patient, without having to consider any discrepancy between the tacit 
assumptions of his patient – and his own explicit or implicit assumptions about clinical signs. 
Bourdieu admits if it were not so, misunderstandings might be generated and mistakes could 
be made in the diagnosis of the patient; but herein lies the fundamental problem: The 
translation of the spontaneous clinical discourse of the patient becomes the codified clinical 
discourse of the doctor, with for instance a “red patch” becoming an “inflammation”. In this 
perspective, it appears that the clinical practitioner themselves hold a crucial position, where 
they may legitimize any diagnosis based only on their own competence.  
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Moreover, Bourdieu (1988: 64) argues that often neglected factors are those of the cognitive 
effect of the time spent acquiring information, the limitations of the cognitive repertory of the 
expert (the questions not asked) and/or limitations to his skill in deploying his knowledge. He 
explains that these factors can be based on lack of experience, but also from the haste or 
presuppositions (reinforced by leading questions) generated by an emergency. Thus, he 
asserts that a great deal of power is at play through the enquiry process between doctor and 
patient, expert and subject. This is important to consider in light of the Breivik case, as the 
acts of terror invoked an emergency status in most parts of society. 
 
2.5 Legitimacy of experts 
Foucault (1991: 54-60) argues that psychiatric treatment of the mad has not fixed underlying 
social problems at all, because the institution itself is based on exploitation instead of humane 
ethics. Psychiatric experts today most likely hold a higher moral standard than in the classical 
age, but their methodology is highly similar. The media-focus during and after the Breivik-
trial highlighted flaws and weaknesses of appointed psychiatric professionals in court, which 
thus challenged the legitimacy of the work they perform.  
Like Foucault, Bourdieu (1988: xi) emphasizes the great importance to distance oneself from 
one’s own social context:  
“The sociologist who chooses to study his own world in its nearest and most familiar 
aspects should not, as the ethnologist would, domesticate the exotic, but […] exoticize 
the domestic, through a break with his initial relation of intimacy with modes of life 
and thought which remain opaque to him because they are too familiar.”  
Bourdieu (1988) argues the necessity to review the categories of thought we consciously or 
unconsciously deploy. He states that many concepts we use in the scientific construction of 
the social world, often are mere common-sense notions; which have been uncritically 
introduced into scholarly discourse, like the term “profession”, or other terms, that in a more 
or less disguised manner contribute to the effects of social determinism. By being willing to 
constantly revert our modes of thought and/or scientific direction to a point where we can 
analyze the (social) determinants from an objective point of view, sociology stands a chance 
to escape the vicious circle of historicism or sociologism (Bourdieu 1988: xiii). Can the same 
be said for psychiatry? This viewpoint encourages criticism of not only what people generally 
take for granted, but also a criticism of established institutions. More explicitly, it 
problematizes the legitimacy of expert systems that do not distance themselves from their own 
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context or fail to justify the “truth” of their applied expertise. For example, DRK and the first 
forensic psychiatrists in the Breivik-case were criticised for being decontextualized, when 
they ignored essential parts of Breivik’s cultural and societal context (Helmikstøl 2012). 
How can we evaluate their scientific competence? According to Bourdieu (1988), the various 
disciplines within society are arranged into two categories, “the higher” and “the lower”. The 
higher consist of the faculty of theology, law and medicine – and are able to provide the 
government with the strongest and most durable influence on the people. He explains that 
these faculties are also the most controlled by the government, the least autonomous from it 
and are entrusted with creating and controlling customary practice, which then provides 
ordinary exponents of knowledge, priests, judges and doctors. According to him, the lower 
category and its faculties have no temporal power. Bourdieu (1988: 62-63) quotes Immanuel 
Kant: “The ‘right wing of the parliament of knowledge’ holds authority, whereas the left wing 
holds the freedom to examine and object.” This suggests that psychiatry can only be properly 
examined and criticised by those institutions (lower disciplines) that lie farthest away from the 
“right wing of the parliament of knowledge”.  
Bourdieu (1988) declares that the competence of the doctor or jurist is a technical competence 
guaranteed by the law, which in turn gives the authorization and legitimacy to execute a more 
or less scientific knowledge in practice. He elaborates on the fact, that medical researchers are 
subordinated the clinical practitioners, and it thus expresses the subordination of knowledge to 
social power, which decides its functions and limits. He explains that the very initiation 
ceremonies of the higher faculties sanctify a competence, which is inextricably social and 
technical. Foucault’s (1991) genealogy of the concept of clinical medicine similarly revealed 
this dual dimension of medical competence. Bourdieu (1988: 63) also describes the 
progressive institution of social necessity, which underpins the social importance of 
professors of medicine. Importantly, he asserts that it distinguishes their scientific art from all 
the technical skills that confer no particular social authority (like for instance the engineer). 
Bourdieu (1988: 84-85) thus argues that the reproduction of the university body is strategic, to 
ensure for those endowed with agency positions an elitist and statutory authority. He 
describes the regulation of entrance as a function-related attribute, which is much more linked 
to hierarchical position than to any extraordinary properties of the applicants or their work. 
According to Bourdieu, the extent of the semi-institutionalized power which each agent can 
exercise in each of the positions of power he holds (his “weight”), depends on all the 
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attributes of power invested in him – invoked for example by the usage of terms of address 
such as “Dean” or “President”. Bourdieu also puts forward, that the production of legitimacy 
within these institutions derives from a mutual social relationship between the members of 
several secondary institutions overall and not least by personal affiliation to them (being a 
university president or elector to that office). 
Bourdieu (1988: 85) describes the mechanisms behind admission to the higher institutions of 
academics: Within the Institute, the members are divided more or less equally between the 
“academic” and the “scholarly” or “intellectual”. Together, he claims they can exercise over 
the whole field, and especially on the former, that of an immense institutional power of 
control and censorship. He sees that capital breeds capital, and that there is a link between 
teachers with high academic capital and the success of their pupils. Bourdieu asserts that to 
hold positions that confer social influence will determine and justify holding new positions – 
themselves invested with all the weight of their combined holders. This clearly suggests that 
positions that confer social influence are not necessarily publicly accessible, and as such do 
not represent a democratic structure, or one based on merits – but rather an elitist 
congregation existing under the guise of social camouflage. Such a case disfavours those who 
do not share the specific capital needed to be part of that academic field, and it thus provides 
protection for those already initiated by preventing “intrusion”.  
The bottom line is that if to acquire the capital needed to sit in elite positions that confer 
social influence is seemingly restricted to specific groups, based on preconditions rather than 
merit and achievements, it raises doubts about the performance, reliability, objectivity and 
accuracy of whatever tasks the holders of those positions perform. The 2011 Norway Attacks-
crisis and the aftermath has shed light on the dysfunction of several important positions within 
the social body, and in particular forensic psychiatry. The public debate thus indicates 
discontent with psychiatric expertise – as it failed to meet the public expectations, which casts 
doubt on the reliability and capability of their work.  
 
2.6 Towards a paradigm shift 
Bourdieuian and Foucauldian discourse analysis has so far invited us to compare Norwegian 
psychiatric expertise to historical and more contemporary socio-political scenarios apparent in 
their research. In the context of the Breivik-case and the massive criticism directed towards 
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the expert system of psychiatry, it is interesting to explore whether its seemingly 
unconditional dominance on forensics will prevail in the years to come. With the exception of 
occasional public criticism, forensic psychiatry has largely been an applied expertise hidden 
from public view, which prevents interference from competition. Through the extensive 
media coverage, arguments and opinions on the subject crossed paths with numerous 
academic disciplines including psychiatry, psychology and the nonprofessionals. Through a 
Bourdieuian and Foucauldian viewpoint, this setting challenges psychiatry’s prominent 
position within the judicial system, but Habermas’s viewpoint extends on their frame of 
reference and provides a scope for examining the argumentative circumstances that surround 
these public discourses. Similarly, Kompridis, Mercier and Sperber offer additional means to 
comprehend the logics behind argumentation and broaden the interpretative context. 
Habermas (2006) contributes to understand how the concepts symbolic capital and discourse 
are interconnected with negotiating truths on any matter through (rational) argumentation, and 
can be compared with aspects of what he terms communicative action. Within this paradigm, 
he highlights that truth can only be achieved through “ideal speech-situations” where 
participants are required to have the same capacities of discourse, social equality and not 
being bound by ideologies. He points out that these conditions mark some boundaries 
between the public and private sphere, but that these very boundaries are deteriorating in 
contemporary society. He thereby offers a framework for studying the conditions surrounding 
the “battle zone” between expert systems, and for explaining how the mass media has power 
to regulate the discourses. The deterioration of boundaries that Habermas points out in 
contemporary society can be seen in relation to how the public interfered with the 
professional expert remarks in the Breivik-case. The knowledge-conditions between the 
professionals and non-professionals were different, yet the latter were highly influential. This 
supports Habermas’s notion of a future less bound to traditional institutions, and will be 
discussed in chapter 5. 
In Habermas’s (2006) theoretical framework, it is possible to identify the various types of 
arguments people engage in, and for what purpose. He distinguishes between three intentions 
of rational argumentation; validity claims to the truth, validity claims to normative correctness 
and validity claims to truthfulness (Habermas 2006: 8-16; Joas & Knöbl 2011: 230). In short, 
they describe aspects that ought to constitute professional normative validity. Habermas (cited 
in Joas & Knöbl 2011: 232) points out that the importance of each validity claim depends on 
the context and circumstances, but that his model of rationality is versatile. His model may as 
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such be used to analyse professional discourses that are apparent in the analysis. His theories 
are also a useful point of departure, to discuss how different professional norms coincide or 
interact through the various discourses/viewpoints. 
Habermas’ (2006) theory of action is almost inseparably linked with the conception of 
rationality, as it is based on the theory of rationality. Communicative action does not assume 
an actor in isolation, it is not teleological, and does not adhere to given norms or a means-end 
schema (Joas & Knöbl 1999: 232-233, 234-235). Rather, communicative action suspends the 
validity of predetermined goals, and emphasizes honest discussion that does not have a fixed 
goal. In this context, the different parties’ goals and ends can and should be revised, refuted 
and convincingly rejected.  
In the perspective of Habermas, everybody thus needs to have an open mind about the 
outcome of the conversation, to ensure a conclusion that is not based on predetermination. 
Habermas (cited in Joas & Knöbl 1999: 235-236) emphasizes that this action scenario is 
geared towards mutual understanding through argument, and that it can lead to more fair and 
desirable resolutions. In the analysis, I will portray various contexts and argumentative 
discourses that can be compared with such a conception. In chapter 5, I will use Habermas’s 
communicative action schema, to discuss further if, how and why certain aspects of the 
scenario necessarily promote an improvement of the existing expert systems related to the 
court. This could help clarify the possibilities of change within the current judicial system. 
With the intention to understand the logics behind argumentation and reasoning, Mercier and 
Sperber (2010) fittingly introduced a theory named Argumentative theory of reasoning. As the 
name suggests, their theory shows how humans argue and for what reason they do so. 
Consistent with their thoughts, common belief declares that arguments are usually put forward 
to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, Mercier and Sperber claim that 
much evidence demonstrates that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor 
decisions. In this context, they explain that the function of reasoning is argumentative, with 
the intention to devise and persuade. They put forward that reasoning is adaptive given the 
exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to 
misinformation. 
According to Mercier and Sperber (2010), a consequence is thus, how skilled arguers are not 
by default after truth, but after arguments that support their claim. This is in line with the 
implications of the term confirmation bias. They reckon that humans are equipped with this 
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strong bias in order to win arguments, and is as such not negative by design – but it’s 
consequences in public debates such as in the Breivik-case may be viewed as negative. They 
explain that the confirmation bias is present not only when people argue, but also when they 
proactively reason from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. We may compare 
this to instances where representatives from the discipline of forensic psychiatry has 
addressed public criticism, to evaluate the worth of their counter-arguments. They elaborate 
on the fact that when people who disagree with one another can discuss a problem amongst 
themselves, it will partially balance out their confirmation bias, and make the group able to 
focus on the best solution. Hence, to work in interdisciplinary groups, especially if they are 
prone to disagreement, is in this perspective portrayed as desirable. This may be compared to 
the overall Breivik-scenario where the various media outlets and fora have enabled such a 
common ground for discussion. 
Kompridis (2006: 187-189) offers a similar, but alternative framework to Habermas used not 
only to understand arguments and their conditions, but also to rework and rephrase a speech 
scenario in order to steer it towards untried directions. His term reflective disclosure is based 
on Martin Heidegger’s world disclosure. The former refers to a thought-process where we can 
“unlearn” what we know about something, and “reinvent” its meaning. He argues that 
reflective disclosure detaches itself from the restrictions of traditional practices, and its 
versatility thus offers real alternative possibilities for speech and action. Kompridis self-
critically claims to expand the normative and logical “space of possibility”. According to him, 
the strength of this perspective lies in uncovering possibilities that have previously been 
suppressed or untried, or refocusing a problem in a way that makes something previously 
unintelligible, intelligible.  
Kompridis (2006: 264-280, 30-34) argues that Habermasian self-understanding restricts itself 
to clarify the procedures by which we can reach argument, and that his own framework can 
instead denote practices where we can articulate meaningful alternatives to current social and 
political conditions. He asserts that reflective disclosure is the first step to initiate a significant 
contribution to political, ethical and cultural transformation. According to him, such a method 
can lead to affect conditions of possibility, by imposing on questions such as: “What 
constitutes a thing, how is true or false determined and how is the best way to go about 
something?” 
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Where Habermasian critical theory may have its limitations, Kompridis presents a viable 
alternative. They both offer a solid point of departure, if we were to look at for instance the 
“validity claims” within specialist/legal discourse and its mechanisms. Habermas lets us study 
the conditions and boundaries of professional speech and action, but Kompridis invites us to 
re-think the whole setting of the Breivik-scenario. Is the existing (traditional) method to 
appoint psychiatrists and base the criminal code on the principle of medicine, the best-suited 
way to ensure a fair trial and a correct sentence for perpetrators like Breivik, who are not 
easily placed into the pre-determined categories of mental illness?  
 
2.7 Summary 
Sociology of knowledge is characterised by an aim to uncover potential misleading aspects of 
our thoughts about the world, and the recent criticism of forensic psychiatry and expert 
opinions has revived the need for such an approach. In this study, the perspectives of 
Bourdieu and Foucault are useful to understand questions tied to “symbolic power” and to 
what Bourdieu refers to as “symbolic violence”.   
The legitimacy of forensic psychiatry rests on the quality of their work as experts. When put 
into the Foucauldian/Bourdieuian perspective, the relevance of the knowledge their profession 
is founded on can be discussed and compared to that of alternative professions. Symbolic 
violence and professional power struggles are terms that will be tested on these grounds, in 
relation to the language of psychiatry. In addition, parts of the Norwegian political framework 
is tied to the debate, to shed light on the validity of the principle of medicine and the 
government ideology. In the words of Bourdieu, it is important to distance oneself from one’s 
own social context, and that is why psychiatry is placed in a historical and political context.  
The actual communicative context of discourses that originate from the Breivik-case is 
discussed in light of Habermas, Kompridis, Mercier and Sperber as they offer a way to 
understand the logics behind argumentation in terms of rationality, reasoning and 
preconditions. Like Foucault and Bourdieu, they focus on language and discourse – but in a 
more fundamental and de-contextualized manner. For example, an employment of 
Habermasian mode of thought can entail to look at the validity of truths-claims that are 
negotiated in the social setting. The perspective Kompridis implies, promotes a de-
contextualization of any pre-determined goals and truths in a speech context. He underlines 
the value and importance to recognise new possibilities of outcomes through argumentation. 
21 
 
Mercier and Sperber’s term confirmation bias helps to reflect on why arguments are portrayed 
in certain ways, with attention given to whether a speaker is in a defensive mode and if there 
are factors present that cancel out the effects of the bias.  
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Chapter 3  
Research method and design 
 
One of the purposes of analysing the data material was to reveal a nuanced picture of 
contemporary discourses surrounding forensic psychiatry within the given period. More 
important was to address the aim of the study. From an early stage in the data-collection, I 
predicted to find content that proved the existence of several professional dilemmas related to 
forensic psychiatry, as well as sources supportive of the contemporary system. In light of the 
intense criticism suffered on behalf of the field of psychiatry, I also expected to find content 
that suggested a paradigm change or modification to the existing expert systems. In the midst 
of the public debates, there were clear signs that professional power struggles were at play, 
and I thus looked at how the arguments were constructed and for what purpose. Language and 
discourse were hence essential terms for the interpretation. 
I am theoretically inspired by Foucault and Bourdieu, who are commonly associated with 
discourse analysis through large-scale research projects. However, it is not obvious how such 
an analysis can be employed in a study like this. I therefore chose a more tangible approach 
inspired by qualitative content analysis. In order to address the research question, qualitative 
content analysis together with case study design proved a valuable combination. Florian 
Kohlbacher (2006: par. 75-80) explains that the strength of qualitative content analysis lies in 
how it synthesises openness, while transforming information that is essentially qualitative to 
quantitative evidence. In this process, it offers the opportunity of a more comprehensive 
approach, while being strictly controlled methodologically by a systematic step-by-step 
analysis of the data material. Kohlbacher further claims that in contrast to its quantitative 
counterpart, qualitative content analysis features the context as central to the interpretation 
and analysis of the material. Hence, it is not only the manifest content of the material that is 
important, but also the latent content as well as formal aspects that need to be taken into 
consideration. According to him, this is in line with achieving a holistic and comprehensive 
analysis of complex social phenomena. 
Bryman (2012: 304-305) states that as well as being a transparent research method, it is often 
favourably referred to as being unobtrusive. This entails that the researcher is not taken into 
account by the participants of the study, and is therefore a non-reactive method. However, 
while the content analysis itself does not induce a reactive effect, the documents may have 
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been at least partially influenced by such an effect upon their creation. He asserts that this 
method is highly flexible, and can be applied to a wide variety of different kinds of 
unstructured textual information. Moreover, it is readily used for generating information about 
social groups to which it is difficult to gain access. 
Julie W. Cox and John Hassard (cited in Kohlbacher 2012: par. 73-74) claim that qualitative 
content analysis provides means for triangulation, in the sense that the weaknesses in a single 
method can be compensated for by the counter-balancing strengths of another. Kohlbacher 
explains that triangulation takes place on two levels: On the first level, data is triangulated by 
the integration of different material and evidence, as well as by integrating quantitative and 
qualitative steps of analysis. On the second level, triangulation takes place when methods of 
analysis that have not been particularly developed for a purpose are applied to a different 
research design – like the case study. In sum, these aspects are what may lead to a “thick 
description” or a holistic approach. 
To use documents as sources is hence useful to analyse and extract relevant information 
related to the phenomenon in focus (Grønmo 2004). However, Bryman (2012: 306-307) 
claims: “A content analysis can only be as good as the documents on which the practitioner 
works.” According to him, documents should be assessed in terms of such criteria as 
authenticity, credibility and representativeness. I will therefore elaborate on this in the next 
sections, by first explaining how I proceeded to locate the sources that became the base for the 
analysis. I will then point out the considerations that were made involving the relation 
between the data and my position as a researcher, where the validity of my sources will be 
evaluated too. Finally, I will discuss the quality of this study and determine how well it 
addresses my thesis. 
 
3.1 Generating data 
As I reviewed the possible outcome of the research in this study, I considered using a 
qualitative method as the most feasible – much because the themes I was interested in might 
not be easily captured through quantitative methods. There was also an abundance of 
available material through printed articles and electronic databases, and content analysis 
offered a suitable framework for capturing the larger professional discourses that relate to my 
thesis. Most sources in the data material contained a discussion of forensic psychiatry on a 
societal level, and I sorted out those that lay closest to the research question. I chose to focus 
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on both published articles in newspapers, and on published articles in periodicals affiliated 
with departments of law and medicine. I also included public government documents. The 
reason why I did not focus solely on for instance periodicals is that I wanted to compare 
public viewpoints with expert opinions. This can be seen as a step taken towards increasing 
the quality of my findings. All in all the study has given me an insight to how forensic 
psychiatry is perceived through the public and professional eye, and provided a scope for 
detecting professional dilemmas. 
 
3.2 Collection of data 
I chose to retrieve and analyse documents. Halvorsen (2003) refers to secondary data, as data 
that is already produced by somebody other than the researcher. This approach clearly has 
limitations, but also advantages. Working with secondary data increases the time needed to 
get familiar with the data set, and it is often demanding to reduce the complexity of all the 
available information. However, according to Bryman (2012: 313-315) re-analysis may offer 
new interpretations and the researcher is able to spend more time on the actual data-analysis, 
and it is favourable in the cost/time-perspective. With this in mind, I found it necessary to 
select data systematically based on explicit criteria, in order to address my thesis accurately 
and not end up with a skewed representation. I also chose to include data that related to the 
same professional dilemmas, but from different angles and from different actors. The 
intention was here to avoid one-sidedness and to be more objective. I considered that to 
capture a broader perspective in the analysis would increase the value of the discussion in 
chapter 5.  
The type of secondary data I have used can be referred to as process-generated data 
(Halvorsen 2003). This data is in a dynamic relationship to the sender and receiver, in the 
sense that it was not originally processed for this analysis. The data herein surfaces in 
connection with various phenomena occurring in society, and can be viewed as discourses 
presenting certain attitudes on given topics. Discourses tied to the Breivik-scenario are 
plentiful, and have been frequently presented through (newspaper) articles, public debates and 
interviews because of the severe impact on society and individuals. This type of process-
generated data is commonly divided between personal sources, institutional sources and 
public sources.  
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For this study, the two latter were of interest. Public sources, such as Official Norwegian 
Reports (NOUs) provide a government-ideological perspective in addition to Norwegian laws 
that shed light on several aspects of the legal system and forensic psychiatry. Strictly 
speaking, newspaper articles are not easily placed into these categories, but they convey 
information from senders to the public, from politicians, debaters, knowledge workers and so 
forth – which is information that is sometimes not easily accessible, and hence useful. It is 
also fair to assume that many voices would not have been heard, had it not been for the media 
channel. In my aim to include more perspectives, including newspaper articles was an obvious 
choice. 
It occurred to me that it was hard to locate “pure” supportive sources for forensic psychiatry 
after the beginning of 2012, and I became interested to find the reason. The answer could be 
consensus in favour of criticism, but also for instance the result of a sensationalist editorial 
bias in media caused by the tension around 22nd of July. After all, the media is sometimes 
referred to as the fourth estate, as it conveys a lot of influence and power. One could also 
consider “mainstream opinion” to have a discouraging effect on others who disagree, and it 
may thereby prevent others from entering the public debate. Nonetheless, I found too little 
information to analyse this aspect in a satisfying manner (although non-information is 
valuable too) – and the angle falls outside of my thesis. The few viewpoints in support will 
still be included and compared with the criticism.   
 
3.3 Filtering and coding 
I decided to focus on data from 22nd of July 2011 and onward, and as of now, topics related to 
forensic psychiatry and the Breivik-scenario are still frequent. Over time, these topics have 
decreased in popularity, but forensic psychiatry is still problematized through media in 
connection with other court trials with similar characteristics, suggesting that professional 
dilemmas tied to their expertise have not yet been resolved. Therefore, analysing material 
from the whole spectre of time was a plausible approach. Yet, December 2011 serves as a 
central departure point for criticism, as this was when the first evaluation report was leaked to 
the press.  
In terms of authenticity, the sources are publically available through trusted sites and 
publishers, and are as such not likely counterfeit. In addition, they are time stamped and 
themselves include (external) sources, thus increasing their legitimacy. The Norwegian laws 
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and government statements originate from trusted official documents and websites, and are a 
direct source for what government ideological guidelines forensic psychiatry must follow. In 
line with capturing an array of expert and public discourses, the sources consist of expert 
interviews through different media channels, by representatives from forensic psychiatry, 
psychiatry, the judiciary, psychology, political science, neuroscience and so forth; as well as 
articles written by various journalists, debaters and other knowledge workers. In chapter 5 I 
reflect on the weight given to certain speakers/actors, based on what professional field or 
social entity they represent. 
I treat the different sources as either academic or non-academic. I define an academic source 
as written by someone with credentials, often in a periodical that is reviewed by peers or 
research. I define non-academic sources typically as newspaper articles, magazines, blogs and 
websites that do not end in .gov or .edu and so forth. This is my first stage to determine the 
weight of a speaker, where the second is to review the speakers’ academic or non-academic 
affiliation. The consequences of different weighting and its sociological interpretation is 
discussed in chapter 5 in connection with symbolic violence and Habermas and Kompridis’ 
schema of rational argumentation and the way to desirable solutions.   
Once I gathered an extensive data set, I created categories in order to filter them. I started out 
with approximately 71 sources, and discarded 45 of them because I did not consider them 
relevant, and because some content was highly similar. I ended up with 26 in total. My 
categories were initially based on a prediction of which professional dilemmas could be 
directly tied to forensic psychiatry, but I moved away from this approach, since I considered it 
too specific and distanced from my research question. My new categories were instead: 
1. Criticism of the first evaluation of Breivik – 5 sources 
2. Criticism of the second evaluation of Breivik – 5 sources 
3. Supportive of contemporary forensic psychiatric work – 5 sources 
4. Implications of ideology and politics on forensic psychiatry – 4 sources 
5. Indications of an emerging paradigm shift (within expert systems that cooperate with 
the court) – 7 sources 
These categories were designed to capture information that supports the existence of 
professional dilemmas, coded by relevance of theme and were hence more in line with the 
guidance of the research question and theory. The category “Supportive of contemporary 
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forensic psychiatric work” fulfilled a different task, to provide a counterbalance for the other 
categories, and to provide a more comprehensive scope for the discussion in chapter 5.  
 
3.4 Contextual aspects 
According to Idar M. Holme and Bernt K. Solvang (2003), the content of a source is subject 
to a dynamic relationship with the historical context of which it exists in. They explain that 
sources as such represent partial information about a context, which can lead to a more full 
understanding of the historical situation. The data material is intended to portray the larger 
contemporary discourse surrounding forensic psychiatry. This angle enables a direct approach 
to the Breivik-case, and the fact that the terror attacks happened over two years ago, means 
that it is possible to hold a more broad approach to the scenario; compared to if a similar 
study was conducted immediately after the incident. I base this on the assumption that fewer 
opinions would have been voiced, the data would have less time to mature in analyses and 
people may have been emotionally biased by the severe impact of the terror attacks on 
society. In 2013, the memories are still fresh, but the social tension in this context is slightly 
different. To a certain degree, this allows a more objective approach.     
It has been important for me to pinpoint who utters what, in which way, where and why, 
because all pieces of information are related to one another for a comprehensive 
understanding. It has hence been important to show how the content is interpreted to ensure a 
high quality of analysis. Additional research was performed to gather information on the 
(academic) background of the speakers, as it was not always stated in the source. I mainly 
used the internet to crosscheck this information. In addition, the content of the sources can 
convey information to both a normative and a cognitive degree. According to Holme & 
Solvang (2003), both elements are present in a text, and one may dominate over the other. For 
example, cognitive sources can measure the effect in practice of laws and similar, while 
normative sources convey intentions and attitudes. Both elements are reflected upon in the 
text. 
The five newspapers from the data material are Aftenposten, Verdens Gang, Dag og Tid, 
Morgenbladet and Klassekampen. Aftenposten is former right wing and culturally 
conservative, but it is now considered mainstream and liberal-conservative. It is the largest 
newspaper in Norway and is distributed daily and nationally. Aftenposten is owned by the 
same company that owns Verdens Gang. This newspaper is the second largest in Norway, 
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tabloid, politically independent and distributed daily and nationally. Dag og Tid and 
Morgenbladet are politically independent and distributed weekly and nationally. 
Klassekampen is left wing and socialist, distributed daily on a national basis. The periodicals 
used represent different areas of expertise within the academic fields of psychology and 
psychiatry.    
 
3.5 Ethical considerations 
I have not conducted interviews or produced primary sources, and there are hence certain 
additional ethical considerations that must be made. Tove Thagaard (2003) states that the 
utterances of individuals in the sources must be respected. She says the analyst must preserve 
authenticity in such a way that was originally intended by the sender, and although there has 
been no direct contact between informant and analyst, the representation of the information 
must keep the same standard as if that was the case. This is important because the represented 
individuals do not have the option of controlling how their interests are taken care of by the 
analyst. Overall, this increases the credibility of the study, since the conclusions made by the 
researcher must retain as high as possible standards that result from an impartial analytical 
process.  
A perfect foundation for analysis would be to gain access to all available and relevant 
information. Although that was not achieved, I still gained access to a lot of useful 
information, that enabled me to indicate certain tendencies within the professional fields 
related to this case, and to locate recurring views from individuals and groups. I also 
recognize that the different actors have separate reasons for fronting their views and that will 
be discussed according to the conceptual and theoretical framework of this study. Lindsay 
Prior (2004) emphasizes that documents can be interpreted differently depending on the 
analyst and context. That is why I have strived towards a more exploratory and general 
approach, while analysing the data systematically. The findings may well in consequence be 
transmissible to similar phenomena concerning forensic psychiatry or related expert systems. 
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Chapter 4  
Analysis 
 
In light of the 2011 Norway Attacks the experts systems of law and medicine, as well as the 
conception of accountability, were disputed in most media channels. This eventually gave rise 
to numerous professional dilemmas that the discipline of forensic psychiatry must face.  
 
4.1 Consequences of the 2011 Norway Attacks 
One contributor to the debate, Professor of history of ideas Gudmund Skjeldal (2012a), states 
that the case of Breivik puts the complete academic field of psychiatry to the test. He critically 
asks (my translation):  
“Should someone who develops a hostile worldview not be punished, even though he 
makes a fertilizer bomb? Even when he prepares mentally by listening to ideologically 
motivating music, like some sort of athlete? Even when he seems to be reluctant to 
shoot someone at point blank range? Does this not remove his responsibility and 
thereby his human dignity?”  
Skjeldal (2012a) pronounces that psychiatry’s position in society was disputed after the first 
mental evaluation was made public, and that the principles for accountability are currently at 
stake. He is surprised by the fact that a large part of the contributors to the critical debate, 
consists of psychiatrists and psychologists themselves. He says that some forensic 
psychiatrists, like Anders Gaasland, are even refusing to work because they reckon forensic 
psychiatrists have too much power in court. Gaasland (cited in Skjeldal 2012a) hence wants 
new principles for the evaluation of accountability, instead of abiding to the prevailing 
principle of medicine. Skjeldal claims that professors of psychology in Oslo have wanted this 
debate to surface, and he refers to Forensic Psychologist Grøndahl who holds such views. 
According to Skjeldal, Grøndahl reckons the background for the Norwegian approach is 
related to a methodological pragmatism, where an evaluation is made easier for forensic 
psychiatrists if they do not have to present a causal relationship between psychosis and the 
criminal act.  
Skjeldal points out a significant problem where moral righteousness is in conflict with 
Norwegian law and ideology, and where the principle of medicine acts as a central obstacle 
between them. He is surprised by the active participation in debates by psychologists and 
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psychiatrists, something that can be seen as a sign that they wish to take the criticism 
seriously, but in a Bourdieuian (1988) and Foucauldian (1991) view, it can be seen as an 
attempt to retain the existing power relations within court now that they have been challenged. 
Whatever the motive, comments from Grøndahl and others suggest that the methodological 
pragmatism that allegedly hinders the quality of psychiatric work must be critically revised in 
order to move forward. 
Forensic Psychiatrist and former member of DRK Randi Rosenqvist (2011) claims in a 
featured article that much of the public criticism is misguided. She says many have confused 
the conception of punishment, and according to her, it is thus a logical flaw to discuss whether 
unaccountable perpetrators can be punished; it is rather a question of how they are punished. 
In this context, she emphasizes the importance to define the term unaccountability. She gives 
examples of how mental definition is an ongoing process, and that since 1842 the definitions 
have changed for the better and have enabled a better and more optimistic framework for 
treatment. She argues that the government has ignored certain requests to change and improve 
the formulation of laws, because they reckon it would complicate the communication between 
court and appointed specialist. She does however point to the fact that the department of 
justice is working on a legislative amendment that will ensure that unaccountable perpetrators 
(who have committed small enough felonies to avoid punishment) will get necessary 
treatment, compulsory if necessary. As regards serious felonies, she puts forward the 
suggestion to build prison hospitals, but then a completely new set of regulations would have 
to be discussed.  
Rosenqvist points out some flaws within legislation that hinder the development of forensic 
psychiatry, and refers to resistance from the government. She insists that language and 
communication is a concern when it comes to adopt changes into the system. Seen through 
the viewpoint of Bourdieu (1988) and Foucault (1991), the court has mainly relied on 
psychiatry since 1842 to produce the knowledge needed to deal with the mentally ill and 
criminal deviant. While the accounts of Rosenqvist show signs of willingness to improve the 
system of evaluation, it also reveals steps taken to extend the grasp psychiatry has on the 
unaccountable criminal deviants. This can thus be interpreted as a power struggle between the 
government, law and psychiatry, which is seemingly justified by an obligation to help the 
borderline psychotics.  
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According to Rosenqvist, the government hesitates to adopt amendments to law on grounds of 
communication. In line with Habermas (2006) and Kompridis (2006), communicative action 
begins with rational argumentation that may only be possible if each actor speaks the same 
language. The initiative from the government can thus be seen as a positive consideration, but 
it is not obvious why psychiatry should have such an impact on the definition of this 
particular type of criminal deviance – when psychology and other fields of competence have 
knowledge that could shed further light on the subject. Part of the public criticism against 
(forensic) psychiatry is directed against the inadequacy of the psychiatric language, and hence 
Rosenqvist fails to address this major issue. 
 
4.2 Two psychiatric evaluations 
During the court trial of Breivik, two pairs of forensic psychiatrists were appointed, and two 
separate conclusions were presented as evidence to the court. Only the first was approved by 
DRK, and was the one that deemed him insane and unaccountable for his actions. Opinions 
were thus split on the matter, and this became a feud and a chief concern in the nationwide 
public debate. 
 
4.2.1 First evaluation by Synne Sørheim and Torgeir Husby 
Amongst other serious issues, the first evaluators and court were accused of not including a 
broader academic competence. According to Journalist Hanna Haug Røset (2012), Sørheim 
said that it is unusual for specialists to involve other fields of expertise. Researcher of defence 
and terrorism Anders Romarheim (cited in Røset 2012) claims that the approach used in the 
second evaluation of Breivik was more useful, because it included the political aspect, where 
the first evaluation defined away anything that could be remotely associated with politics. 
District Court Judge Wenche Arntzen asked Sørheim about the effectiveness of potential 
treatment of Breivik, in which Journalist Åse Brandvold (2012, my translation) quotes the 
response: “[…] there is no doubt that to treat delusion is the hardest part when medicating 
schizophrenia. However, we are optimists of treatment. We have plenty different medicines, 
and it would take much to not be able to reach the goal of treatment.” 
Compared to the approach used in the second evaluation, the methods of Sørheim and Husby 
represent a conservative view where psychiatry is responsible for treating any kind of mental 
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illness, as the involvement of other fields of expertise is considered unnecessary. Through 
Bourdieu (1988) and Foucault (1991), we can trace this behaviour to similar phenomena 
apparent in their research, which may indicate a strategic unwillingness to embrace alternative 
practices. In such a case, the applied clinical act of Sørheim and Husby implies a form of 
symbolic violence, if its nature stems from different aims than to aid the patient and assist the 
court by advising the judges on a fair and correct judgment of the perpetrator. Consistent with 
Habermas (2006) and Kompridis (2006), it is fair to assume that their validity claims are not 
particularly founded on rational argumentation, as they resemble a one-sided view seen only 
through the eyes of psychiatry. 
Bourdieu (1988) described the faculty of theology as the third member of the higher 
disciplines. Theologists were not particularly active in the public debate, but in a debate in 
Dag og Tid with Journalist and Author Jon Hustad, Dean of Western-Aker Prosti Trond 
Bakkevig was accused of characterising psychotic persons as persons without human dignity. 
Bakkevig (2012) denies this view, and claims he instead meant that such a view is held by 
those who wish to distance Breivik from themselves and the society we live in. He states that 
this is a way to deny responsibility for the perpetrator’s actions. Bakkevig holds firm that a 
person should be able to stand responsible for his own actions if he or she wishes. Hustad 
claimed Bakkevig had lost his moral compass as a priest. Bakkevig in response declares 
character assassination as a part of Hustad’s debate-technique. He asserts that responsibility, 
verdict and punishment are not interchangeable terms, and that the verdict should be given by 
the court and the punishment should be determined by both the judicial system and appointed 
forensic psychiatrists. 
These reactions can be interpreted as a disagreement between which roles are assigned in the 
judicial system and between what moral consequences the procedures have for the 
defendant/perpetrator. Bakkevig suggests that forensic psychiatry is expected to do more than 
just evaluate the mental health of a subject, namely determine punishment, although this is not 
required by law. This may indicate a common belief amongst Christians in Norway that the 
higher discipline of psychiatry has an authority, which is linked to a moral obligation to 
punish, in line with the duties of court and God. A way to interpret this power constellation 
could be to compare it with the Trinity of Christianity. In a Bourdieuian (1988) and 
Foucauldian (1991) perspective, the three disciplines are in this context able to control 
customary practice, produce knowledge and authority and thereby assert more social power 
across the whole field when united, which could explain why Bakkevig supports forensic 
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psychiatry. The connection between theologists and psychiatrists was also evident in 
Foucault’s studies of madness, and he showed how the two faculties once competed for social 
control of the mad and gained influence on government.  
While most accounts in media criticised the first mental evaluation of Breivik, some cherished 
it. In an expert interview in Dag og Tid, Einar Kringlen (Nestor and Professor Emeritus of 
psychiatry) raises no doubt about his opinion on Breivik’s mental health (Gjerdåker 2012). He 
states that the initial forensic psychiatric report is founded on comprehensive police 
documents and a series of conversations with Breivik. He adds that the specialists have 
information from his mother, half-sister and others that verify the impressions given in the 
conclusion. According to Kringlen, this information along with their observations led to the 
diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. Kringlen emphasizes that the central issue is that the 
perpetrator was psychotic while he committed the crimes, thus deeming him non-accountable 
in accordance with Norwegian law. He supplements this claim by establishing that one can 
have paranoid psychosis without inner voices.  
When confronted with the public criticism of forensic psychiatry, he replies that journalists, 
authors, historians, and other experts without a background in medicine or psychology have a 
pre-determined view on the evaluation (Gjerdåker 2012). He agrees that the report itself was 
not a “literary pearl”, but that it maintained the essence of quality through its conclusion – 
psychosis. He is then presented with the views of Swedish Psychiatrist Johan Cullberg, who 
was very critical to the report. Kringlen sweeps his arguments away and says that he probably 
wants to be in a new committee. Finally, he responds to a question whether Breivik should be 
accountable for his actions even though he is psychotic, and replies, “You may claim such a 
thing. However, you must then change Norwegian laws. Paragraph 44 of the penal code 
clearly states that an action is not punishable when the perpetrator is presently insane or 
unconscious” (Gjerdåker 2012, my translation). 
Kringlen holds a stern belief in forensic psychiatric work, and reckons that in spite of Husby 
and Sørheim’s poor execution when they created the report, they did everything by the book. 
He implies that they took all necessary precautions and did the needed research to accomplish 
their task. Based on his response to criticism, the opinions of those with a background in 
medicine or psychology are held in higher regard – a scenario that bears similarities to how 
Bourdieu (1988) describes the reproduction system of academia and the “higher disciplines”, 
and practice closure in order to prevent intrusion and reduce competition, as is also explained 
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by Foucault (1991). Interestingly, Kringlen disagrees with a Swedish colleague in a way that 
suggests there is an ongoing professional power struggle between experts who abide to the 
principle of medicine versus the principle of psychology. When asked about whether Breivik 
should be held accountable even though he was considered psychotic, he avoids a direct 
answer, and instead refers to contemporary Norwegian laws. This can be interpreted as a 
conservative stance, and it may again show signs of little interest in the value of other expert 
opinions.  
In an article in Klassekampen, Brandvold (2012) gives an account of Breivik’s first mental 
assessment, where Sørheim and her colleague Torgeir Husby claimed that it was necessary to 
give Breivik a low score on the GAF-scale (Global Assessment of Functioning), based on his 
danger to society. According to Brandvold, professionals compare the lowest score levels 
with someone who can barely tie his or her own shoelaces, and Prosecutor Svein Holden 
confronted them with this. Husby replied that they needed to give him the score of two 
because it relates to the danger of enacting harm to himself and others, which we have already 
witnessed on 22nd of July, in spite of his cognitive function.    
In this context, Husby and Sørheim justified the placement of a very low score on the GAF-
scale, by claiming that Breivik was a risk to society. Foucault (1991) showed through his 
research that the mad were treated on grounds of protecting society, and that psychiatric work 
is legitimized by addressing public needs and moral obligation (of which according to him has 
not solved anything), and is similar to this scenario. Sørheim and Husby’s actions can be 
viewed as a means to protect society, a perceived need that may have been invoked by the 
crisis of the terror acts themselves. Bourdieu (1988) speaks of situations like this, where 
medical personnel may be hasty and presuppose a diagnosis, given the circumstances of an 
emergency – and their clinical action can thus be seen as symbolic violence on behalf of the 
patient, whether intended or not. 
Some think the scale of the crime should be separated from the perpetrator himself. Doctor 
and member of Minotenk think-tank Wasim Zahid (2011) claims in a featured article that 
although Breivik bears similarities to other terrorists, he is still different because his beliefs 
are founded on false premises and a serious mental illness. He holds that no matter how 
bizarre an ideological conviction, it does not necessarily relate to a serious mental illness. 
However, he sees paranoid schizophrenia as an organic disease with clear diagnostic criteria. 
He claims that the expert evaluation (the first report) is based on an established judicial 
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practice, which is agreed upon by a wide public and political consensus. Zahid asserts that if 
the diagnosis is correct, the principle of medicine must stand in the Breivik-trial even though 
it might seem highly unfair. He stresses that the severity of the mental illness decides the 
evaluation of accountability, and not the seriousness or brutishness of the crime. He 
concludes, by giving a reminder: Had Breivik only killed one person; we would not have 
reacted on a national scale – as it is the scale and brutality of the case that challenges our 
principles and notions of justice.  
Zahid has described the status quo of the relationship between court and psychiatry, and 
cherished its ideological background. In doing so, he supports the contemporary system of 
appointing forensic psychiatrists and thinks it necessary to work by the principle of medicine. 
His opinions were voiced before the second pair of forensic psychiatrists concluded that the 
actions of the perpetrator were founded on beliefs that are in contact with “reality”, as 
opposed to beliefs that exist based on hallucinations, delusions and constrained insight. 
Bourdieu (1988) and Foucault (1991) would be cautious of establishing a “disease of the 
mind” as the cause of an action, as the very knowledge that gave life to such a concept 
originates from the language of psychiatry alone, but Zahid’s view may yet represent the 
commonsensical belief in how these expert systems work.  
 
4.2.2 Second evaluation by Terje Tørrissen and Agnar Aspaas 
District Court Judge Arntzen was cited in an article where she claimed that the 22nd of July 
case was particularly difficult to handle (Peters 2013). During the trial, she experienced 
Breivik as calm and focused, and explained that he commented on the witness statements and 
related his comments to the specifics of the case. Arntzen pointed out that this provided 
important information on his ability to stay focused, and helped determine if he could be held 
accountable for his actions. According to her, the prosecutors, forensic psychiatrists, lawyers 
and counsel performed their duties as expected, even though the first report was leaked to the 
press. She also pointed out that the two first expert psychiatrists performed well, considering 
that they were under extreme media-pressure. Yet, two additional psychiatric experts were 
appointed who arrived at a different conclusion. 
Arntzen (cited in Peters 2013) was presented with the claim that the status of forensic 
psychiatrists as experts was challenged and that they apparently found themselves amidst a 
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crisis, because of the two different conclusions. She declared that the disagreement between 
the parties was merely an advantage to the court:  
“As legal practitioners we are used to disagreements, and base our work and lives 
upon them. We experience dissent in the Supreme Court all the time, which does not 
mean at all that jurisprudence is in a crisis mode. Therefore, I believe that the fear of 
disagreement between the forensic psychiatrists is unfounded” (Peters 2013, my 
translation).  
Arntzen (cited in Peters 2013; Andersen 2013) put forward the main reasons why they 
decided to appoint two new specialists. One was because the employees of Ila Detention and 
Security Prison, where Breivik was being held, had not witnessed signs of psychosis. The 
second was because of the public debate, and the third was because there were no significant 
arguments against doing so. Last, but not least, she asserted that the core of any court 
proceeding is to do things right, both in the conclusion and in the argumentation leading up to 
it.  
As Judge, Arntzen had the final say and was final authority in the case. Her statements 
thereby show signs that the court is still autonomous from other expert opinions, but it does 
not clarify if the court is concerned with addressing all issues about forensic psychiatry that 
have been brought to attention. Seen through Bourdieu (1988) and Foucault (1991), how she 
portrayed the scenario can be viewed as a means to bring closure to the Breivik-case, and 
avoid to cast doubts on the verdict he was given. Her opinions on disagreement can be seen as 
an indirect openness to input from experts other than forensic psychiatrists, especially because 
she acknowledged that public opinions were important for the court decisions, something that 
is not stated in legislation. Arntzen depicts a picture where both authorities from law and 
medicine are in total control of the situation, something that Bourdieu describes as a necessity 
– as they lose power if they present themselves in a state of disarray. That is thus one way to 
explain why she chose those words, to avoid a further investigation into the realm of their 
expertise. This can further be linked to how someone in her position likely experiences much 
social pressure to appear in control of situations, as failing to do so might compromise trust in 
the legal system and the government.  
Forensic Psychiatrist Terje Tørrissen and his colleague Agnar Aspaas were appointed for the 
revaluation of Breivik. In a featured article after Breivik was sentenced, Tørrissen (2012) 
reckons that his field of expertise was widely unknown before the first mental evaluation was 
completed, and hopes that the broad commitment from the public debate will lead to 
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necessary improvements of the system.  He puts forward that the Breivik-scenario was a 
natural stage to discuss a transition to the principle of psychology, until he was sentenced and 
deemed accountable. He thereby regards the verdict as a clear statement that such a discussion 
is unnecessary, because Breivik is, and was, accountable for his actions in the eyes of the law. 
Tørrissen holds that the principle of medicine is a good principle in many aspects, even 
though it builds on a dichotomist principle (sick – not sick). He reasons for this by saying: If a 
person has a serious mental illness; he or she should be given the necessary treatment and not 
be punished. Another argument, he claims, is that there is a broad consensus over which 
conditions constitute the principle. However, he asserts that the quality of the evaluations 
must be improved – and that is the core of the challenge forensic psychiatry is facing.  
Tørrissen (2012) declares that there are good reasons for implementing the principle of 
psychology too. He says there are many people who walk around with serious mental 
illnesses, but who are not active psychotics and who understand what they do and have done. 
According to him, these people get away with punishment based on the doubts of their 
accountability with the result of dismissing the case (based on the principle of medicine). 
Tørrissen states that this group of offenders usually commit small felonies, but still pose a 
formidable threat to society and the police in particular. He reckons the mental health care 
does not want to treat these people, because it requires many resources and often the patients 
do not want to be treated. He thinks that an implementation of the principle of psychology 
entails that perpetrators become jailed, and frequently visit mental health care institutions.  
Tørrissen (2012) proclaims that any improvements of forensic psychiatric evaluations will 
mean a significant increase in public spending. He deems this necessary, as for instance 
observations in secure psychiatric wards are scarce, given little attention and under-
dimensioned. In light of the debate involving the autonomy of the court versus trusting 
appointed specialists, he emphasizes that the court should trust their own judgment as over 
80% of the conclusions in forensic psychiatric evaluations result in “accountable”. He 
proposes that the threshold for calling in expert witnesses by the defence or prosecutions 
should be raised significantly before they request observation. Conclusively, he desires a cost-
benefit analysis separate from whichever principle is valid, because everything coheres; and 
without a broad analysis of consequence, the result is more than often bad and victimizes the 
patients.  
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Tørrissen is generally positive to forensic psychiatry, but disagrees with certain aspects of the 
contemporary system. He pointed out several good reasons to keep the principle of medicine, 
and to abolish it. Further, he acknowledged that to improve the contemporary system would 
be a costly process, but that this stage is long overdue. He admitted that there are some 
weaknesses in forensic psychiatry, but mainly argues that the cause lies solely in the hands of 
the politicians. He also blames the court for not trusting its own instincts, and prosecution and 
defence for frequently resorting to forensic psychiatric observation and evaluation, which is 
often unnecessary and in turn leads to a victimization of patients.  
In the perspective of Bourdieu (1988), Tørrissen and his colleagues of medical practice 
exercise social power, and are thus influential in the outcome of the scenario – but they are 
not autonomous from the laws in effect, and hence rely on the government and jurists to bring 
forth a change in the system. This is in line with how Tørrissen points out political and 
bureaucratic flaws that affect their work, but he and his colleagues may ultimately affect their 
decisions. In addition, how the methods of the first evaluation can be considered symbolic 
violent acts invoked by the emergency of Breivik’s attacks; the methods of Tørrissen, Aspaas 
and Arntzen can equally be viewed as influenced by the extreme media pressure directed 
specifically towards them – a kind of public trust emergency. We may hence identify two 
separate symbolically violent clinical acts.   
 
4.3 Professional power struggles 
In an expert interview in Journal of the Norwegian Psychological Association, Stålsett stated 
that she was particularly critical to the first psychiatric report on Breivik’s mental health 
(Helmikstøl 2012). She reacted when they did not consider the context he was a part of, and 
how the specialists attributed words that are already used by others to his idiosyncratic reality. 
She states that decontextualized psychiatry is antiquated, and that is why the second report is 
better – because Breivik becomes closer to us all. She denounces how some people mark him 
as both evil and sick, as it redeems him of all guilt and human dignity. She reckons, that one 
cannot simply write off evil as belonging to the domain of mental illness, because it removes 
the perpetrator from our society in which he is a part. She points out that Breivik is a deviant, 
but also a reminder of and a symbol of certain aspects of contemporary society. Stålsett 
(Helmikstøl 2012, my translation) proceeds to challenge psychologists in Norway: “Do we 
have a language yet that accommodates the existential?” 
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Stålsett sees Breivik as an extreme exponent of tendencies in the Norwegian culture; where 
shame, strive for perfection, the little extra, the grandiose, the fight for acknowledgement or 
the romanticizing of individuality is what might characterize us as modern Norwegians. In her 
perspective, we may not yet have a language that is able to describe Breivik’s attributes in a 
satisfactory way. With this in mind, Stålsett does not consider the discussion on Breivik and 
psychosis finished. She highlights the shortcomings of forensic psychiatry, and pinpoints a 
recurring explanatory problem: Language. As described by Bourdieu (1988) and Foucault 
(1991), the language of psychiatry has been largely uncontested for over 200 years, something 
that sheds light on the importance of Stålsett’s views. In their perspective, language and 
dominating discourses can be regarded as key factors and differentiation mechanisms that 
ensure the authority required by psychiatry to remain in their current position in society.  
To exclude psychologists from the practice of forensic psychiatry can therefore be interpreted 
as an act of closure to prevent intrusion. In line with Habermasian (2006) and Kompridian 
(2006) thought, pure objectiveness and “truth” can only be achieved when each party has 
equal circumstances for rational argumentation. Compared to the accounts of Psychologist 
Anne-Kari Torgalsbøen (2012), this court situation appeared to fall short of such conditions. 
She claimed in a periodical that the judges deliberately chose to ignore psychological 
expertise in the Breivik case. According to her, this is serious as the official reason for 
disregarding psychologists was inhability. She acknowledges that inhability concerns must be 
taken seriously, but that objectivity must be taken equally serious.  
In her opinion, the legal system did not try hard enough to ensure a broad enough academic 
competence in the special case of Breivik. She thus asks how can we safeguard the legal 
protection of a person, and give the correct sentence when psychologists might not arrive at 
the same conclusions. She goes on to say, that judges should prefer competence to 
accessibility, even in today’s busy workdays. Torgalsbøen exclaims that she is often accused 
by psychiatrists of fuelling a power struggle with representatives from psychiatry. In 
response, she points to a problem in legislation, that states when experts are appointed to the 
court, it requires one psychiatrists to be present at all times, but not necessarily psychologists. 
She claims that the laws need to be changed to elevate the status of alternative practices, in 
order to promote a better legal system for everyone.  
Through the utterances of Torgalsbøen, psychiatrists appear to use accusations of professional 
power struggles to defeat criticism. In a Bourdieuian (1988) and Foucauldian (1991) 
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perspective, this may be signs of defence against opposing expert systems that challenge their 
elevated position in court. Torgalsbøen insinuates that the judges act similarly – but this may 
simply be a sign of ignorance or disinterest. Nonetheless, she argues that in the midst of the 
power struggles comes the deterioration of the legal system, as she describes how a broader 
academic competence will aid everyone involved in the legal system, from judge to 
defendant. She also argues that we live in times of stress and busy workdays, and that 
competence should be preferred to convenience. She proposes that the laws be changed, so 
that to achieve objectivity in forensic psychiatry becomes a main goal.  
As explained by Habermas (2006) and Kompridis (2006), this is in line with achieving 
communicative action. However, in the viewpoint of Mercier and Sperber (2010), the 
confirmation bias is considered heightened when people are in a defensive stance, which may 
thus be applicable to this scenario where professional power struggles are apparent. Opinions 
voiced in this context may hence be considered less valid. This may thus lead to a less chance 
of arriving at desirable solutions, because the different parties are less likely to incorporate 
criticism and instead support their own beliefs and claims. 
Bourdieu (1988) described the higher disciplines of law and medicine typically as not being 
autonomous from the government, but that the former have intertwined interests with each 
other. In an expert interview one day before Breivik was sentenced, chief physician Anne 
Kristine Bergem at Dikemark Psychiatric Hospital announced that they might not treat him 
even if he is considered non-accountable and psychotic by the court (Dommerud & Foss 
2012). She argues for this, by saying that it is unthinkable for them to treat someone based on 
someone else’s forensic psychiatric report, as it is their responsibility at Dikemark to diagnose 
their own patients. According to her, they only treat patients who need treatment. She states 
that her arguments apply even if the court transfers Breivik to involuntary psychiatric 
treatment, and refers to the observation her colleagues had already performed which showed 
that Breivik was not psychotic. She admits that they must keep him there by law, but they are 
not obliged to go against their principles, and hence they will not treat him unless necessary. 
Conclusively, she adds that they are still open for revaluations and disagreements of earlier 
reports. 
Bergem’s remarks show that Dikemark operate by strict principles that allow them to have a 
kind of veto against court decisions. To a certain degree, they are thus autonomous from the 
court and the government – something that indicates that there are several “factions” of 
41 
 
psychiatry within the discipline as a whole. When she referred to their own evaluation of 
Breivik, she was confident that he is not psychotic. Bergem’s unwillingness to treat him, even 
if the first evaluation were accepted as proof by the court, clearly signalises that she does not 
automatically approve of the work done by other (forensic) psychiatrists. Even though she has 
stern opinions on the subject, she recognizes the value of disagreement between experts, 
which through Habermas (2006) and Kompridis (2006) can be understood as a prerequisite to 
pursue communicative action and solutions that are more desirable.   
 
4.4 The border between psychosis and accountability 
Central to the Breivik case and forensic psychiatry is the conception of psychosis and 
accountability. In an academic journal for mental health care, Philosopher and Author 
Lindstrøm (2012: 176) wrote a lengthy and critical article where he puts forward the question: 
“Can a person be held responsible for his or her actions, when they are closely tied to 
psychotic delusions?” He claims this perspective is of increasingly more topical interest – 
especially after Breivik was initially diagnosed “paranoid schizophrenic” and thereby 
considered unaccountable for his actions. Lindstrøm argues that many psychiatric experts had 
trouble settling down on that conclusion. After observing Breivik in court, forensic 
psychiatrist Henning Verøy (cited in Lindstrøm 2012: 176) exclaims that he did not appear to 
be psychotic. However, he argues that the societal and worldview of Breivik is not easily 
reconcilable with how the world de facto is. According to Lindstrøm, the question remains: 
Where is the limit between normal-extremist nonsense and psychotic delusion?  
Lindstrøm (2012: 176) points to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
DSM-IV, which states delusion is characterised by views that are held alone, and are not 
usually accepted by the culture or sub-culture of that person. He argues that if for instance a 
religious sect leader has an immediate congregation supporting him at all times, his doctrine 
will not be considered a psychotic symptom or disease of the mind, no matter how haughty or 
vain the comparison might be when compared with common sense and science. Lindstrøm 
criticises the conclusion of Sørheim and Husby, because they did not include facts about how 
other people and groups shared the views of Breivik. He defaces the wording of DSM-IV too, 
since the very definition of psychotic madness rests on how legitimate the view of someone 
is; based on if the majority supports such a view – a claim that according to him sounds 
speculative at best.  
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Lindstrøm (2012: 177) exclaims that many of the so-called “new” words that Breivik uses 
have been incorrectly interpreted as symptomatic (for example “national Darwinism” and 
“Knights Templar Justitiarius”) as they are commonly used by radical right wing (internet) 
debaters. To hate Islamic people and “cultural Marxists” is also common in many other 
communities. Historian Øystein Sørensen (cited in Lindstrøm 2012: 177) claims that the 
perpetrator’s manifesto is permeated by a “totalitarian mentality”, which resembles the 
political ideology of Hitler, Stalin and Khomeini – and as such should not be diagnosed by 
psychiatry at all. In his opinion, they are simply political deviance. Professor in philosophy, 
Arne Johan Vetlesen (2011) voiced much the same views in a public debate, and underlined 
the danger to base the verdict on the first evaluation – as it may comprise a similar diagnosis 
of thousands of mass-murderers with ideological motivation. 
Lindstrøm (2012: 177) claims it is hard to deny that Breivik was driven by political motives. 
From a theoretical-medicinal perspective, he asks whether it is possible that a political view is 
pathological or at the very least a symptom of an underlying disease. He imagines a veritable 
pandemic of pathological irrationality, where the members of a political movement “infect” 
each other with the same hopeless delusions. If this is possible, Lindstrøm claims that the only 
difference between contemporary society and the Maoist wave of the seventies is that the 
“great pandemic” that sweeps our land is associated with a distinctive right-wing symptomatic 
worldview. He supplements this, by adding that many people held a radical political view in 
their youth, only to become more “centralised” as time goes by. He claims that the lack of 
political success and ambitions to start a family usually dismantles radicalism, although some 
people persist and succeed. Lindstrøm argues that our most valued and established political 
views in society belonged in the past to the political wings of extremism, and that the political 
context should no doubt have been included in the first psychiatric report. 
From a moral- and forensic philosophical point of view, Lindstrøm (2012: 189) claims it is 
not obvious why cases of psychotic delusion should exempt a person from taking 
responsibility for his or her actions. If so, he reckons delusions are not to be considered 
pathological or symptomatic per se. According to him, a series of psycho-pathological 
conditions like personality disorder can be subsidiary to perform criminal acts, without the 
perpetrator automatically being acquitted of his or her crimes. However, Lindstrøm explains 
that psychosis is unique in the sense that it involves “a lacking ability to realistically evaluate 
ones relationship to ones surroundings”. As stated by him, the word ability is key in this 
connection. He elaborates and states that medicinal “normal” people, as most ideological 
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extremists are, can make irrational choices that harm themselves or others – and as long as 
their sense of reason is intact, they can be accused of abusing it from time to time. On the 
other hand he says, if Breivik really is inept at realistically evaluating himself in relation to his 
surroundings, then it is hard not to think that he believes his terror actions would contribute 
greatly to the war against Muslims (Lindstrøm 2012: 178).  
Lindstrøm (2012: 178) draws on this line of thought, and links a parallel to how we react in 
different situations. If a “normal” person is late to a meeting, he or she will get a reprimand, 
and maybe even an ultimatum. He states this reaction is unacceptable if a person with senile 
dementia did the same. Still, Lindstrøm declares there is a big difference between dementia 
and psychosis. According to him, one is usually diagnosed with dementia after endless and 
repeated forgetfulness over a long period, whereas you can be diagnosed with psychosis based 
on one or a few delusional events. He asks, can we thus conclude that a person suffers from a 
general cognitive deficiency based on one fatal misjudgement? Many psychotic delusions are 
clearly defined conceptions of what a person considers valuable, and in this manner, 
Lindstrøm sees psychotic delusions to have more in common with political extremism and 
religious superstition than with meaningless cognitive errata. 
Even if Breivik suffers from some psychotic delusion, Lindstrøm (2012: 178) claims there is 
little evidence that supports the fact that he generally lacks the ability to interpret reality 
realistically. If he did not have this ability, Lindstrøm asserts it is highly unlikely that he 
would be able to calculate and enact such a complicated “master plan”. He also states, that 
Breivik anticipated he would be universally hated after his actions, which he to a large extent 
was – but that some of his predictions and fears were wrong, like for instance becoming 
tortured in prison (unless of course long-term isolation is being tortured). Lindstrøm 
additionally points to that Breivik has shown the ability to change his prejudiced opinions on 
certain aspects.  
Lindstrøm (2012: 179) concludes, by stating that if Breivik had been the leader of a right-
wing extremist terrorist group, he would have been able to voice far more severe views on 
society than he has done so far, and still not be diagnosed as psychotic. He reckons a lot 
would depend on his charisma and whether the group accepted his “Führer”-image. 
According to him, Breivik never tried to establish his own Dunkelblaue Armee Fraktion, 
partly because he was afraid that it would attract too much attention and subsequently lead to 
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arrests by the surveillance police. He asks, how can such a calculating man be considered 
anything else than responsible for his actions? 
Lindstrøm dissected all the validity claims of the first psychiatric report. In light of Habermas 
(2006), the argumentative quality of their work hence fails to meet the standards of 
communicative action. Lindstrøm raised awareness of all the logical failures that are 
associated with the categorisation system of DSM-IV and its implications on how society is 
“supposed” to view madness, and this can be linked to Bourdieuian (1988) thought on how 
psychiatry produces knowledge to control customary practice and belief. Breivik was 
compared to people who are known as terrorists and dictators, but who are not considered 
psychotic and unaccountable for their actions.  
Lindstrøm also pointed out that language comprehension was not a strong side of Sørheim 
and Husby’s evaluation, as the wording Breivik used turned out to be rooted in reality. 
Through the description by Lindstrøm, psychiatry thus falls short on nearly all counts of 
validity, as the integrity of their work appears to lack substance. In reference to Kompridis 
(2006), one can see Sørheim and Husby in this context as “locked” within their own 
presuppositions and unable or unwilling to think outside the box.   
Lindstrøm also pointed out how psychiatry diagnoses psychosis based on one or few 
behavioural incidents, whereas dementia is first constituted when certain patterns occur 
regularly. In this context, it does not seem obvious why psychosis can be ascertained based on 
so few observations – as the criteria of psychosis seem arbitrary compared to that of dementia.  
Moreover, Lindstrøm problematized the borders between psychosis and politics, and argued 
that the difference between them is separated only by a very thin line. He claims that proof for 
one or the other is randomly based on if the majority considers a societal or worldview as 
legitimate. This can be compared to Foucault’s (1991) descriptions of how the elite expert 
systems decide what is normal and legitimate through their leading discourses, spoken in a 
language they created themselves.  
Lindstrøm is a philosopher and author, and does thereby not fit into the criteria of the higher 
disciplines. Through Kant (cited in Bourdieu 1988), we understand that the right wing of the 
parliament of knowledge holds authority, whereas the left wing holds the freedom to examine 
and object. With this in mind, I interpret representatives from the left wing (Lindstrøm et al.) 
as competent and important contributors to the debate that regards the right wing, and that 
their opinions should consequently confer weight in the public debate. The issues Lindstrøm 
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and others raised awareness of can be understood as important to overcome in direction of 
achieving communicative action, and are key to understand the professional dilemmas in the 
aftermath of the 2011 Norway Attacks.   
 
4.5 Controversies of the principle of medicine 
The principle of medicine has so far proven to be an obstacle between traditional-conservative 
forensic psychiatric work and more dynamic approaches. Before the second evaluation was 
completed, Institute Leader and Psychologist Ingunn Skre and psychiatrist Vidje Hansen 
(2012) wrote a featured article titled “Abolish the principle of medicine”. They state that the 
time has come to move away from this principle, where psychosis allows indemnity in the 
Norwegian court of law. They say that the case of Breivik shows the importance to detect 
mental illness early and to use good psychiatric diagnostics, as his current psyche and 
background is clearly placed into a familiar psychiatric context. In addition, they claim many 
tragic fates could have been avoided if the health services could intervene and help at a much 
earlier stage in life, and this would rely on the quality of psychiatric work.  
Skre and Hansen (2012) agree that this is not the only shortcoming of contemporary 
psychiatric practice, as forensic psychiatry is impaired in court too because of the relation 
between the principle of medicine and indemnity. They thus refer to the first evaluation of 
Breivik and the conclusion. They say that since Breivik was aware of his actions, he would 
only be punished if the principle of psychology were implemented. Skre and Hansen claim 
that even though the court makes the final decision, it is unlikely that they could deem Breivik 
non-psychotic, even if the next two psychiatrists make that conclusion. They state that the 
reason for this is that the court would have to base their decision on the benefit of the doubt, 
which likely supports the claims that he is sick.  
Skre and Hansen stated that early warning signs need immediate psychiatric attention, to 
avoid a further psychotic development. They further problematize that in clear psychotic cases 
such as Breivik, the principle of medicine would always redeem the perpetrator of guilt and 
punishment. The way they point out these facts, can be seen as a desire to incorporate a more 
efficient, accurate application of psychiatry, where they give a conception that psychiatry is 
not taken seriously enough, and that the principle of medicine obstructs a logic court 
proceeding when the perpetrator is aware of his or her actions. In the perspective of Bourdieu 
(1988) and Foucault (1991), it can also be seen as a method of increasing their social power 
46 
 
relations and jurisdiction, by arguing for the (social) necessity of their work. The court 
scenario Skre and Hansen depicted is one where the court appears to have little psychiatric 
insight, and is therefore more or less forced to base their decision on the first evaluation, 
which indicates a communicative problem and lack of transparency. Indirectly, I interpret this 
as a view where the court is not autonomous from expert opinions. Because it is a 
perpetrator’s right to be given the benefit of the doubt, they hence claim that the principle of 
medicine prohibits the court from punishing a perpetrator if there are any signs at all of 
psychosis. Altogether, the ideology behind the principle has elements related to the judicial 
system, psychiatry and the government – and can as such be understood as one of the most 
obvious and influential connections between them.  
Skre and Hansen (2012) state that to move towards the principle of psychology is a step in the 
right direction, if the court and forensic psychiatry is to be taken seriously. They acknowledge 
that Sørheim and Husby might be wrong in their analysis, but that whichever quibbling relates 
to the accuracy of his diagnosis matters little if we incorporate this alternative principle – 
where the important issue is whether the perpetrator is aware of his or her action, and if the 
psychosis somehow led directly to its execution. According to them, it is of utter importance 
to make these changes, so that the court is better positioned to do their job, and so that 
forensic psychiatrists can focus to determine any link between the perpetrator’s mental state 
and the criminal act. They also desire a better functioning health care system that can treat 
patients at an earlier stage to quench psychosis before it develops further.  
Skre and Hansen (2012) refer to the police chief Truls Fyhn, who was a strong opponent of 
the principle of medicine. According to them, he saw criminals daily, who were found non-
accountable because of psychosis, and who committed minor crimes, anti-social behaviour 
and violence regularly, well aware of its legal consequences. They also refer to a public 
hearing for the Norwegian Psychiatric Association (NPA), which announced in 2009 that the 
socio-political climate of today emphasises the independence of the individual, including 
those who have psychotic conditions. NPA stated that there in some cases are contradictions 
regarding the indemnity of patients with psychosis, but who are aware of their actions. In this 
connection, NPA said there are many reasons to start a debate to challenge the usefulness of 
the principle of medicine. Skre and Hanssen reckon the time has come to take it further.  
They depict a perspective, where many express a misbelief in and perceived dysfunction of 
the principle of medicine, and criminals who exploit the system become an important 
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contribution to that argument. Except from how they propose psychotic criminals (who are 
aware of their actions) should be punished, it is not clear how they want to treat their mental 
illness – as an implementation of the principle of psychology prevents them from being taken 
into custody and care by a mental health care institution. Moreover, they state that Breivik 
would certainly be punished if it were the principle of psychology that was the frame of 
reference. Unlike most professionals, Forensic Psychologist Grøndahl (cited in Thorvik 2012) 
says the psychological principle would not exempt him from punishment, because he 
considers his actions to be in direct connection with the delusional world in which he sees 
himself involved in a civil war, where the extermination of his own people is at stake.  
According to Grøndahl, this allowed Breivik to give himself the power to decide who lives 
and who dies in Norway. Once more, expert opinions are split on the question of 
accountability, and as a result, many wish to abolish the principle of medicine to enable 
change. However, the larger legal discourse on psychosis contains more elements than simply 
to improve forensic psychiatric methodology, and in light of Habermas (2006) and Kompridis 
(2006), one would thus expect a reflection on this by the experts from psychology and 
psychiatry. Communicative action and reflective disclosure in this context requires and entails 
the inclusion of viewpoints exterior to psychology/psychiatry or at least for these experts to 
consider that neither of these professions are able to depict the full explanation of psychosis 
and its relation to criminal acts, something that they do not appear to do.   
PhD-candidate of philosophy Mathias Slåttholm (2012, my translation) stated in a debate “If 
we are not prepared to say the action was caused by psychosis, we cannot excuse the action 
on grounds of psychosis.” He chooses to explore the options if the principle of psychology 
were to be implemented. Currently without exception, Norwegian criminal law decides not to 
punish persons who were non-accountable at the time of the crime, according to him. He 
holds much the same views as Skre and Hansen, but adds that if to detect a link between 
psychosis and criminal act is going to have a larger role in future court cases, we must not 
only look for a link, but for the link. He fears that a too weak framework revolving around 
this issue may lead to unfair evaluations, or that it may allow perpetrators to simulate a 
psychotic link to their crime.   
Slåttholm points to an important aspect that is likely to play a big role if the principle of 
psychology is implemented. He also stresses the importance to stand by ones words, in 
connection with the relationship between morals and law, something that is perhaps presently 
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unachievable when the court abides to the principle of medicine. In line with Bourdieuian 
(1988) and Foucauldian (1991) thought, Slåttholm points to important argumentative aspects 
in the public debate, as he urges us to reconsider the morals behind our “taken for granted” 
beliefs. New knowledge produced by new laws and ideology needs to be validly justified, and 
as he suggests, the framework to determine the link between psychosis and crime must be 
thoroughly assessed.  
In the perspective of Habermas (2006), such a scenario appears partially positive in terms of 
potentially increased validity on behalf of their claims and arguments. However, through 
Kompridian (2006) thought we may view these circumstances as non-satisfactory as a move 
towards the principle of psychology simply entails a shift of social power relations with the 
court, from psychiatry to psychology, and may not solve other underlying social problems 
related to the case, accountability and trust in expert systems. Comparably, Foucault (1991) 
stated through his research that psychiatric treatment of the mad never solved any underlying 
social problems and in spite of this their methodology and ideology has remained largely 
static. The procedures of the first evaluation of Breivik can therefore be interpreted as highly 
illegitimate compared to the second, but even this more dynamic approach fails to diagnose 
the perpetrator accurately and convincingly. 
 
4.6 The rebuttal to criticism 
As an academic response to all the public criticism directed towards forensic psychiatry, 
prominent spokespeople from the expert systems of law and medicine produced concrete 
suggestions for improvement. In a periodical for the Norwegian Doctor’s Association (DNL), 
clinical psychologist Pål Grøndahl et al. (2012: 1727) thus recognize that forensic psychiatry 
is under pressure, but not in a crisis. They state that much of the criticism needs to be taken 
seriously; and therefore several suggestions had been put forward to improve the standard of 
it, and criteria were set for requirements of an appointed specialist in the court of law. They 
emphasize that since to change this part of the system may have big consequences for 
whomever is being evaluated; it is crucial that any changes made are based on scientific 
knowledge grounded in the methodology of evaluation. Grøndahl et al. add that psychiatry 
should review its academic background and perhaps lose some of its pride when it comes to 
academic prominence, experience and contemporary status in the field.  
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Their plan for improvement was developed by the renowned professor of law Ulf Stridbeck 
together with four experienced and renowned psychologists and psychiatrists (Grøndahl et al. 
2012: 1727-1728; Foss, Johansen & Færaas et al. 2012): 
1. A golden standard: Introduce a more wide usage of standardised and scientifically 
accepted methods of fact finding and testing, as the Norwegian method is seen as 
peculiar, since brief and simple conversations between specialist and subject is 
considered sufficient, compared to other Scandinavian countries that include other 
tests.  
 
2. Council of colleagues: Appoint a council of peers who have good competence with 
psychic evaluation within forensic psychiatry, especially through diagnostics and 
evaluation of personality and risk. 
 
3. Specialty: Ensure higher standards of expertise by introducing specialties or sub-
specialties for both psychiatrists and psychologists. This entails systematic and 
educational courses, followed by approval in order to provide services for the court. 
 
4. Organizational attachment: Create an organizational framework that resembles that of 
other branches within medical jurisprudence. The new layout and structure should 
illustrate and clarify the interdisciplinarity of the field, in the section where clinical 
psychology constitutes a natural part of forensic psychiatry. 
  
5. Clinics of forensic psychiatry: Observation should be done in standardised 
environments, such as clinics or policlinics dedicated to forensic psychiatry. This will 
allow examinations that are more thorough and thereby minimize the risk of error. As 
it stands today psychiatrists travel between prisons, psychiatric wards, the homes of 
the subjects and their own offices. In addition, they have lots of time-consuming 
administrative work – like collecting information and various writing tasks. This takes 
away the time they should be using on their main task, examination. We propose that 
other branches or professions could assist in retrieving important data, as they already 
do in Sweden and Denmark. In Sweden and Finland, you have separate clinics with 
hospitalization possibilities, and in Denmark, you have polyclinics. 
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6. Transparency: Forensic psychiatrists should automatically be given access to vital 
journals and health-related information. This should be included in legislation, in 
connection with serious crimes where misjudging is has big consequences (minimum 
six years in prison). It is clear that when important documents like these are omitted 
from a psychic evaluation because the subject refuses to release them, that there is a 
risk of faulty work, which leads to misjudging. 
  
7. Accountability: Narrow down the criteria for being considered non-accountable, by 
reducing it to two groups: The first group includes a core group of people who have 
clear signs of psychosis. The second group will fathom people who are severely 
mentally challenged. We see it as non-relevant and unnecessary to include conditions 
that impair consciousness. A narrowing down of the criteria will allow the specialists 
and lay judges to more easily and accurately interpret and consider the advice given 
from forensic psychiatrists. Importantly, this can allow more people to be given the 
human dignity, which is implied when one has to take responsibility for ones actions. 
It will also mean that the power and influence that forensic psychiatrists are accused of 
having in court is reduced. 
 
8. Implementation of mixed or psychological principle: The principle of medicine, as it 
stands, has dire contradictions. A perpetrator is automatically unfit to plead and 
considered non-accountable even if he or she is aware of the criminal nature of an act. 
If we introduce a mixed or psychological principle, it can lead to a concrete evaluation 
in each specific case. We desire to implement a sub-criterion, where the defendant 
(with a psychotic condition) is asked whether he or she knew what they were doing, 
and/or if that action was illegal. This is similar to the “M’ Naghten”-rule, which is 
used in many English—speaking countries. Another sub-criterion is to consider a 
possible connection between the defendant’s psychotic condition and the criminal 
action. It is likely that to implement sub-criteria, will decrease the number of people 
who are considered unfit to plead and non-accountable for their actions. 
  
9. Change the mandate: We reckon that it is a good idea to change the existing mandate, 
so there is a more explicit division regarding the roles and expectations of the different 
parties involved in a court trial. This will in turn provide the court with more 
independent means of performing juridical resolution. One way to do this is by letting 
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the forensic psychiatrists determine if the subject fulfils a set of clinical criteria, which 
are related to the most serious mental disorders stated in the International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10). This can be done 
without translating the terms into suited juridical categories listed in existing 
legislation. The court itself must then translate psychological/psychiatric/medicinal 
terms into whichever juridical categories that conform to the criteria that decide 
unfitness to plead and non-accountability.  
 
Another way is to keep the existing mandate, but change the question that the court 
must answer; for example, like they have done in Denmark. In Denmark, the 
specialists are expected to advise the court about the possible presence of specific 
conditions – like mental disorder (primarily psychotic conditions), and then the court 
will decide whether they find the defendant guilty. We now look at a marked divisive 
language between the juridical issues of a) what the specialists are there to examine 
and evaluate (mental disorder) and b) what the court has to decide (fitness to plead and 
accountability). We do not have a separate language in Norway, thus we are in a 
weaker position to determine precisely the nature of the perpetrator’s actions at the 
time of the criminal act, and it is accordingly uncertain if the final verdict is accurate 
and fair. 
 
10. Analytical evaluation by the Commission for Forensic Medicine: When the 
commission oversees and analyses the statements of the specialists, it should give a 
concise, but accurate overview of how they evaluated the content and the conclusion 
they reached. Today, if there are no objections, they will simply put “There are no 
(major) remarks to the report”. Such brief formulations could give rise to doubts or 
uncertainties regarding how they concluded, and thus how they evaluated the report. 
We believe these problems can be overcome by introducing explicit criteria and 
standardised methods of evaluation. In comparison, the Danish version of the 
commission produce a written statement and overview of the evaluation. The 
advantages of this goes two ways: First, you get an insight into the thought process of 
the commission and can therefore detect any disagreement. Second, research on 
decision theory shows that feedback is essential for professionals, so that they can 
adjust their judgment and learn from experience. In a best-case scenario, this can 
lessen future imbalances in opinions and misjudgement. 
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According to these ten points by Grøndahl et al., our legal security can be improved and the 
quality of specialist work can be increased. By implementing standards of evaluation and 
setting explicit criteria for forensic psychiatrists, they reckon one can reduce the risk of 
misevaluation that may in turn lead to misjudging. They also desire a creation of an 
organizational fundament and the establishment of separate clinics dedicated specifically to 
this field of work, in addition to a delegation of duties, which they claim will decrease the 
workload. They consider the languages of law and psychiatry a barrier to a comprehension of 
forensic psychiatry, and they have made suggestions to overcome them by altering legislation. 
Grøndahl et al. put forward that this may also increase the autonomy of the court, and there 
will be more proposals in the future.  
Their response to criticism ca be interpreted as a show of humbleness, independence, 
creativity and a will to accommodate the desires of others, while they base their ethics and 
proposals on the intention to benefit the judicial system; and to make sure psychiatric 
evaluations are partaken in a humane way, thus cherishing legal protection and human rights. 
In a Bourdieuian (1988) and Foucauldian (1991) view, this can also be interpreted as a meta-
solution on how to improve the professional field on near all points they have been criticised 
on. They appear to have scrutinised their own expert system and solved the professional 
dilemmas that face forensic psychiatry – but have done so by avoiding addressing certain 
other important aspects of the criticism, such as psychiatry and psychology’s inability to 
justify their knowledge and authority on psychosis and its relation to crime.  
It may be unintended, but their list of proposals bears symbolic similarities to the ten 
commandments of the Bible, which for Christians signifies moral and authentic obligation and 
may per se indicate how the expert system views its status and obligation to society. Their 
ten-point list of improvements dictates numerous changes that they wish to implement, which 
mostly look like a rearrangement of existing power relations. Its authoritative structure and 
wording suggests an intention to steer the public discourse in a predetermined course set by 
themselves, and can as such be viewed as symbolic violence.  
Grøndahl et al. (2012: 1728) address the viewpoints of some, who think that scientific 
research related to forensic psychiatry is insufficient and therefore represents a genuine 
problem related to the alleged “crisis” that they face. As a response, they claim that all 
necessary research is presently done by the three major competence centres for security, 
prison and forensic psychiatry in Norway. They instead emphasize the importance to focus on 
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the proposals they laid out, but recognize that it will be a costly process to implement the 
changes. Nonetheless, they look to the politicians and ask if they are willing to make firm 
decisions and sacrifice more money, in order to secure the principals of legal security that are 
so highly esteemed in Norwegian morals. Compared with Mercierian and Sperberian (2010) 
thought, Grøndahl et al. shape their arguments by reasoning that enough research is presently 
done, when criticism suggests otherwise. Their arguments also focus on proposals that are 
mainly related to modify existing structures, instead of considering alternatives. In this 
argumentative setting, their wording and reasoning makes sense because it supports 
traditional belief in their academic discipline, in line with what Mercier and Sperber refer to 
as the confirmation bias. 
Based on the perceived nature of their claims and intentions, and the academic background of 
the speakers, Grøndahl et al.’s statements can still be seen as credible. However, it is not 
obvious if their proposals will actually solve anything. For instance, others have argued that 
the court can benefit from having a broader academic competence in its array of specialists, 
and not only forensic psychiatrists. Grøndahl et al. do not appear to consider this in their 
proposals, and in this setting, their approach may as such be viewed as a defensive stance. To 
introduce other academic fields into the judicial sphere will no doubt invoke a comprehensive 
legislative process, and challenge the status of both psychiatry, psychology and the court – but 
it is previously untried and there is therefore no concrete evidence for downplaying the 
possible outcome of such an event. In line with Bourdieuian (1988) and Foucauldian (1991) 
thought, the arguments of Grøndahl et al. promote closure and defence against letting other 
academic disciplines into their sphere of power relations with the court.  
In a Habermasian (2006) perspective, they are not including all discourses into their 
arguments and claims of validity, which is thus more similar to a monologue. The presence of 
forensic psychiatric expertise in court has big consequences on perpetrators who are tried by 
the judicial system, and a thorough walkthrough of all aspects of the criticism is important 
and necessary. Ironically, Grøndahl et al. state that their field of expertise should lose some of 
their pride and tradition. In Kompridian (2006) thought, a productive way to do this could be 
to rethink the necessity of psychiatric dominance in court-advisory situations, and consider 
including other available and untried expertise from other areas of academia. Where they 
claim, “much of the criticism needs to be taken seriously”, a justification of what criticism 
they choose not to address is missing. Until such criteria are met, the statements by Grøndahl 
et al. can be interpreted as hidden aggression in an ongoing professional power struggle. 
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4.7 On the verge of a paradigm shift 
Through the media, some have voiced the desire for significant change in the existing expert 
system that advises the court. In a featured article, Doctor, Journalist and Historian Henrik 
Vogt (2012) does so, by first deconstructing the legitimacy and quality of psychiatric work. 
He then dissects the methodology of diagnostics, and discusses how psychologists and 
psychiatrists attempt to portray themselves as representatives of a trustworthy professional 
field. However, he reckons that we must be sceptical when they use the diagnostic manual as 
a cover for objectivity. Vogt thus refers to the philosopher Plato: “[…] anyone who leaves 
behind him a written manual, and likewise anyone who receives it, in the belief that such a 
writing will be clear and certain, must be exceedingly simple-minded…” Vogt first points out 
that diagnoses are not diseases, but linguistic units whose function are to describe what is 
considered to be sick. He explains that diagnoses are not something that people “have” or 
“are”, they are simply written in a book. Diagnoses change when the diagnostic manuals 
change according to him, and humans are like landscapes in constant change and without set 
borders – where diagnostics are like a static map with borders. He explains that maps are 
useful, but they are a hinder for orientation if one does not lift one’s eyes. 
Vogt (2012, my translation) draws attention to Sørheim’s utterance during the court trial 
against Breivik, where she said: “We never attempt to draw psychological interpretations 
from someone’s earlier experiences, what they have been thinking or what this has led to. We 
gather information. To do diagnostics.” He claims their diagnostic manual is already full of 
rules-of-thumb, and has a hard time understanding how psychiatrists cannot think about how 
human lives are mutually connected and only look at pre-defined diagnostic criteria. He goes 
on to say, that Sørheim and Husby both concluded that there was no solid evidence that 
supported the claim of significant mal-development during Breivik’s childhood and youth. 
According to Vogt, psychiatrists and psychologists already proved them wrong in 1983 when 
serious failure of care was detected in Breivik’s family. He explains that the seriousness of the 
parental deficit even led to attempts to remove him from his family, but none of this was 
reflected upon in the first report from 22nd of July. He asks; why did they leave this out? Was 
it because such reflection is poorly suited for today’s psychiatric framework?”   
Vogt (2012) argues that psychiatry attempted to explain the background of suffering in the 
1970s, and it saw no clear border between sick and healthy. He reckons that this led to much 
disagreement amongst themselves about the cause and diagnose, and the result was less 
financing from the public and the industry of medicine. He asserts that the latter party was 
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most interested to place suffering in clear set categories to test their medicine, and the same 
interests were held by insurance companies, welfare institutions and the court as they all 
wanted simple answers; sick or healthy? For Vogt, this forced psychiatry to advocate more 
“descriptive” diagnostics through the 1980s, which inevitably led to a strategy of checklists – 
where a disease is considered present when certain criteria of the manual are fulfilled. He 
illuminates that the focus to set clear borders in diagnostic areas, made forensic psychiatrists 
set “psychosis” as their border between accountable and non-accountable, for non-obvious 
reasons. He declares that the methods used were never problematized, because they never 
asked “why” and expected answers to be self-fulfilled by the placement of symptoms in 
categories. Vogt characterises the standardisation and downplay of interpersonal relations as a 
step towards embracing a common language for professionals. He quotes the doctor and 
historian Mitchell Wilson where he calls this: “a constriction of psychiatry’s outlook”. In 
addition, Vogt claims that the diagnostic manuals were at first disputed, then became 
curriculum and finally taken for granted.  
Vogt (2012) debates whether Sørheim and Husby’s disregard of Breivik’s childhood and 
youth was a strategic choice, because the findings from then were not specific enough for the 
criteria that the diagnostic manual demands. He ties this to how psychiatry used to operate 
differently decades ago, and he remarked that Tørrissen and Aspaas instead acknowledged 
that their checklists were not “reality”, and must not be treated as such. Even yet, Vogt 
stresses that the latter forensic psychiatrists used seven diagnoses in total when they attempted 
to evaluate Breivik. This, he sees as a frustrated effort to match their “maps” with the 
“landscape”. Vogt points to a growing base of research literature on brain development that 
indicates a clear correspondence between what a subject has experienced in his or her 
upbringing and what diagnoses they may be given.  
Conclusively, Vogt (2012, my translation) quotes a comment Forensic Psychiatrist Pål 
Abrahamsen gave to Dagsavisen on June the 8th: “The childhood is irrelevant. We must soon 
quit asking why.” He also quotes Professor of Psychiatry Ulrik Fredrik Malt, who together 
with his colleague Svenn Torgersen introduced the checkpoint list-system in Norway and 
exclaimed in court “Diagnoses must be separated from psychological interpretation” (my 
translation). Vogt asks; must you still not ask why in order to appear scientific in 2012? He 
ends the featured article with a claim that internationally, the public debate sees forensic 
psychiatry as crawling from one ditch to another, from mindless speculation to checklist 
monomania.  
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Vogt paints a picture of (forensic) psychiatry as an expert system that struggles to find its true 
self. He describes scenarios dating back to the 1970s and 1980s, where they moved towards a 
descriptive method of diagnostics because of bad economy, pressure from the industry of 
medicine and lack of trustworthiness. In his view, the latter appears to stem from internal 
disagreement on how to reach their conclusions. He declares that psychiatry attempts to 
increase their legitimacy when they constantly refer to their diagnostic handbook with clearly 
set criteria, but that it is by no means obvious why this should improve the accuracy of their 
work – on the contrary, he reckons that this “blinds” the psychiatrists. Compared to the ‘70s 
and ‘80s, psychiatry does not only face internal disagreement, but also disagreement from 
external academic disciplines and a disbelief in their diagnostic methodology. This suggests 
that psychiatry’s prominent position in society and judicial system is challenged, and 
according to Vogt, a solution can only be found if more people ask “why”. 
Vogt quoted three prominent psychiatrists who boldly claimed that psychology has no part in 
diagnostics. This can be viewed as yet another participation in power struggles between 
competing factions of academia. He problematizes that they never ask why something has 
come to be, and instead focus persistently to find criteria that can place the observant in one 
or more categories to declare a disease, which may be viewed as a sign of a clinically 
symbolically violent act. He also problematizes the way psychiatrists tend to treat diagnoses 
as synonymous with diseases, when according to him people are in constant change, just like 
the landscape – and that a static map or diagnostic is hence insufficient to give an accurate 
picture of the brain.  
I interpret his criticism of psychiatry as a warning that the existing system fails entirely to 
meet the expectations of their work, and that they must choose a new path to regain 
trustworthiness. Vogt does not clearly state how psychiatry can “repair” the damage, but he 
appears to point out that the specifics of the psychiatric expert system (in its current state) 
cannot function as it is. To ask “why” can be seen as essential in a Habermasian (2006) and 
Kompridian (2006) context, if the aim is to pertain communicative action by reflective 
disclosure.  
Doctor and former Forensic Psychiatrist Arne Thorvik (2012, my translation) made a 
suggestion in an expert interview to how the wording of §44 in the criminal could be 
improved to elicit a broader competence in court: “He or she, who is not capable to 
comprehend guilt, shall not be punished.” He states that such a wording promotes the wide 
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array of approaches that are feasible, from psychiatrists and psychologists, but also 
theologists, philosophers, sociologists and historians. He argues for this, by emphasising that 
the problem Breivik represents is more philosophical than medicinal. By opening up the 
landscape of insecurity and interpretation, he reckons that for instance the philosophers may 
play an important part in connection with expert remarks. He explains that experts from 
additional academic fields may function as a buffer for psychiatrists, and force them to clarify 
the terms they use. Not least, Thorvik claims this approach can problematize the premises on 
which our conception of responsibility, guilt, accountability and danger is built upon. This he 
states, will raise the court’s awareness of how uncertain we can be on such questions.  
Skjeldal (2012b) wrote a chronicle, where he on forehand had asked experts from different 
academic fields to give advice based on the first evaluation, on how to understand Breivik’s 
mind. His intention was to simulate a discussion with psychiatrists in relation to the findings 
of the report. These experts had a background in hermeneutics, philosophy of language, 
religious science, sociology, philosophy/ethics, school of authorship and history/rhetoric and 
each gave their contribution in form of comments on exerts from the evaluation. Each 
contributor managed to find different points that could be commented on in light of their 
respective academic field. Each one made remarks that held valid points according to their 
point of views, and appeared to shed further light on the findings of Sørheim and Husby.  
Thorvik and Skjeldal tell us that when a broad academic framework works together on the 
same issue, it will usually be able to elaborate more on the subject, than a limited framework. 
This was merely their example of what the Breivik evaluations could look like, if §44 in the 
criminal code was altered and if the conception of accountability was based on something else 
than the principle of medicine. Nonetheless, the fact that real alternatives to traditional 
forensic psychiatry is introduced into the public debate shows that the contemporary paradigm 
of criminal justice is being challenged. Through Habermas (2006) and Kompridis (2006), this 
can be viewed as a positive development. Through Bourdieu (1988) and Foucault (1991), this 
shows that psychiatry (and psychology) no longer have the authoritative monopoly to explain 
everything that has to do with criminal-psychotic deviance. If the setting for discussion 
Skjeldal organised were real, it would in addition serve as an ideal point of departure, for 
cancelling out the negative effects of the confirmation bias, seen through the perspective of 
Mercier and Sperber (2010). 
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In an article on neuroscience, Journalist Jon K. Time (2011) cited several viewpoints from 
renowned scientists and experts on criminal behaviour in relation to the brain. According to 
Psychologist Simon B. Cohen, we should rid ourselves of the conception of “evil”, and 
instead focus on errors in what he terms the “circuits of empathy” in the brain. 
Neurophysiologist Colin Blakemore states it is scientifically pointless to differentiate between 
actions that are the product of a conscious reflex or caused by disease or brain damage. 
According to Time, our behaviour cannot be separated from our biological brain, which is 
created by evolution. Another spokesperson states that neuroscience already plays a role in 
American courts and as the discipline becomes more accurate, it will become more common 
on a worldwide basis.  
Neuroscientist and Professor of psychology Michael S. Gazzaniga and Forensic psychiatrist 
Pål Hartvig (cited in Time 2011) warn us that neuroscience is still at a very early stage in 
development, and that it has been introduced into courts prematurely. Other representatives 
from law and medicine refer to this statement, and show that many findings of neuroscience 
only show correlations between the brain and our behaviour, not causal relationships. At this 
point, some claim neuroscience is foremost used as a rhetorical tool in the debate on 
criminality, and that any utilization beyond this is premature.  
Yet, Neuroscientist David Eagleman (cited in Time 2011) imagines a justice system that is 
based on science, where question of guilt and blame is subsidiary. In this context, he presents 
what he terms the most important questions: How dangerous will the perpetrator be for 
society in the future and can he or she be helped. He proposes that each individual case is 
evaluated, by considering these questions, instead of asking them once every three years. 
According to him, this can be made possible by advances in neuroscience. He reckons that an 
understanding of the relationship between the brain and behaviour gives us the opportunity of 
a customized sentence, adapted rehabilitation and a chance to build social programmes that 
work on the level of the population. In his words, it is possible to utilize evidence rather than 
bad intuition when we shape our politics. 
Eagleman (cited in Time 2011) admits that in extreme cases like Breivik, neuroscience will 
produce the same conclusion; that he is considered so dangerous that he must be removed 
from society indefinitely. According to him, the neuro law justifies harsh punishment for 
extreme cases like this. This law is concerned with exploring the effects of discoveries on 
legal rules and standards, which draws on neuroscience, philosophy, social psychology, 
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cognitive neuroscience and criminology. He states that the finesses of this approach become 
apparent when there are brains that can be more easily helped. He claims that brains are as 
different as fingerprints, and that Breivik by no means is a “sign of the times”. Eagleman’s 
hypothesis can be strengthened by the theory of Mercier and Sperber (2010). According to 
them, humans are equipped with a strong confirmation bias, which remains active through 
argumentation until a sufficient amount of counter-arguments balance it out.  
In this viewpoint, Breivik may not be a sign of the times, inasmuch that his ideology became 
confirmed and uncontested through communication led predominantly with like-minded 
people. In such a case, his actions and beliefs are more a warning sign of the effects of 
isolation, “brainwashing” and apathy than a sign of the times. In the same logic, the 
confirmation bias can be used to weaken their arguments, because their methodology is not 
the centrepiece of this public debate, but since the discipline of neuroscience is currently not 
in a defence mode the bias is not likely inducing major influence on their argumentation.  
The perspective from neuroscience provides a clear alternative angle, on how to address 
criminal behaviour. The different contributors to this field have voiced the opportunities that 
this science holds for courts in the future, but that it is currently at a premature stage where it 
is best left as a rhetorical tool in the debate on criminality. Interestingly, they appear to 
provide a scope for a complete re-thinking of how politics shape legislation and our view on 
deviance, which is positive when compared to Kompridian (2006) thought. For example, 
Eagleman arrives at the opposite conclusion as Stålsett, when he claims Breivik is not a sign 
of the times. In addition, neuroscience appears to have broad interdisciplinary support from 
those affiliated with neuro law – which seen through Habermas (2006) should enable better 
chances for valid arguments and rational discussion to reach desirable goals. In a Bourdieuian 
(1988) and Foucauldian (1991) perspective, neuroscience is seen as a prominent competitor to 
become a leading discourse on mental health and its correlations with deviance, as their 
scientific knowledge is expanding and according to them, becoming more accurate.  
Coming back to the Breivik-trial, Political editor Harald Stanghelle (2012) claims that the 
court procedures were both orderly and strange. He explains that District Court Judge Arntzen 
ensured dignity and correctness of procedures, but that the case was characterised by an 
intense professional power struggle between experts. He argues, that there has never been so 
many high profile jurists of varying quality that have so publically discussed the juridical 
foundation for possible outcomes of a criminal court case. He goes further and says that never 
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before have psychiatrists and psychologists so loudly discussed the mental health of an 
individual by name. According to him, it is no wonder that it has been dubbed “Norwegian 
Championship in Psychiatry”.  
Stanghelle (2012) refers to one of the second evaluators, Aspaas, who stated that Breivik is 
considered a unique case that challenges both regular frameworks for interpretation and 
psychiatric criteria of quality assurance. Aspaas (cited in Stanghelle 2012, my translation) 
exclaims, “The border between jurisprudence and psychiatry is challenged. We, the 
psychiatrists, must take a step back and realize that we cannot explain all human behaviour. 
Many aspects are atypical here.” Stanghelle claims that these aspects are not fortunate for a 
court that desires clarity, and does not give the court the answers they need. He concludes, by 
stating that it is of the utmost importance that the final verdict reflects these important 
contradictions, and that it is written in a language that is comprehensible for everyone. Only 
then can this court case serve as one of the most important milestones, on the road where we 
can move on as a society, according to him.  
Stanghelle sums up the main lines of the court case and highlights the important aspects that 
were related to it. He noted the apparent power struggles that were dominant throughout the 
case, which he considers to jeopardise the legitimacy of mainstream psychiatric work. Aspaas 
declared that the case marked a decisive and problematic point in psychiatric history, and 
Stanghelle proclaimed the importance to learn something from it. I interpret the scenario they 
describe, as one where psychiatry has lost some of its power in the explanation of human 
behaviour. In a Bourdieuian (1988) and Foucauldian (1991) perspective, psychiatry is fully 
aware of the scenario and is forced to make a decision. Stanghelle has made it clear that this 
expert system alone is not capable of depicting the full truth that is required by court. He 
insinuates that if the academic discipline of psychiatry is to be taken seriously, it has no 
choice other than to address the criticism and accept the fact that their expertise alone is 
insufficient in court.  
As a response to the criticism of forensic psychiatry, the Norwegian government assembled a 
public commission, which assesses the conditions of the Criminal Code on the accountability 
of a perpetrator. They are also tasked with analysing the contemporary custom to appoint 
forensic psychiatrists in criminal cases. Many have voiced that this decision is long overdue, 
since former Minister of Justice Faremo proclaimed that it would take place shortly after the 
Breivik case. The commission consists of a broad academic spectre of experts, and it is 
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scheduled to publish its conclusions by September 2014 (Aftenposten 2013; Justis- og 
Beredskapsdepartementet 2013). 
This tells us that the criticism of forensic psychiatry has been taken seriously by the 
government, and it is likely that we will see some changes when the conclusion is published. 
It also shows how the media and public opinion affects the government, just as it affected the 
court in the Breivik case. In a Bourdieuian (1988) and Foucauldian (1991) perspective, the 
media are a significant actor in the public debate, and they are able to influence decisions 
made on higher levels of government. A reason for this, is how they can unveil “truths” we 
have learned on the way, and through Habermasian (2006) and Kompridian (2006) thought 
they are thus important contributors for promoting communicative action and re-thinking the 
scenario in a desirable way. The commission is composed by broad academic competence and 
as such symbolises aspects of the criticism. This composition might be a clue to how the 
expert systems related to the department of justice might be reorganised – a view that 
according to Aftenposten (2013) is realistic. 
 
4.8 Summary and main findings 
In chapter 4.1, the core issues of the Breivik-case were highlighted and problematized.  
In chapter 4.2, aspects of the two different mental health evaluations of Breivik were 
actualized and placed into the context of public debate and criticism. The first evaluation was 
considered far less valid, more static, de-contextualised and conservative compared to its 
second counterpart, which in the public eye performed better. DRK only approved of the first, 
the court agreed with the second, but neither were considered satisfactory. The disagreement 
between experts was seen as a serious issue, but the role of the judge was portrayed as firm 
and independent. The court was still placed in a mutually dependant relationship with 
psychiatry.  
In chapter 4.3, professional power struggles were identified between psychiatry and 
psychology, but also against other academic disciplines that did not share the same symbolic 
capital. Several accounts of symbolic violence were detected in this context, and attempts 
were made to legitimize the contemporary system based on reference to law and status. Many 
fronted views that they wished to discard traditional psychiatric practice in favour of 
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incorporating a system based on broader academic competence. Several arguments were 
considered less valid because of the confirmation bias. 
In chapter 4.4, Lindstrøm scrutinised the validity claims present in the first psychiatric report 
of Breivik. He showed that the legitimacy of forensic psychiatric work rests on premises that 
are far too de-contextualised and arbitrary to be trustworthy. He also points to DSM-IV as the 
anchor point of psychiatric work. He describes it as antiquated, and shows how many 
problems with diagnostics originate from crude popular belief based on academic consensus 
(mainly from the school of psychiatry).  
In chapter 4.5, the principle of medicine is portrayed as a central obstacle between traditional 
forensic psychiatry and for the development of an improved expert system. Law, language, 
ideology and definitions are central terms that mark boundaries that separate the elevated 
position of psychiatry from psychology and alternative academic disciplines.  
In chapter 4.6, prominent spokespersons from law and medicine proposed what looked like a 
meta-solution to solve the issues they face in light of public criticism. While much of the 
criticism was addressed, it is not clear why for instance the desire of a broader academic 
competence was ignored. As a result, doubt was cast on the effectiveness of their approach 
and it was compared to a setting where the higher disciplines practice closure to reduce 
competition. Their approach was partially explained in relation to protecting interests of social 
standing, and in relation to the confirmation bias. 
In chapter 4.7, the backbone of psychiatric expertise was criticised by comparing it to practice 
from the 1970’s, and onward. Through this comparison, it was put forward that the 
development of their methodology was biased by commercial and socio-political interests. It 
was hence shown that neither of the two Breivik-evaluations were satisfactory, and that the 
quality of them could have been improved through assistance from other academic 
disciplines. Static diagnostic criteria and definitions of disease thus proved unrelatable to the 
dynamic human brain. A re-thinking of forensics and accountability was hence proposed 
through the practice of neuroscience, and through promises launched by the government of an 
extensive improvement of the contemporary judicial system. The confirmation bias 
strengthened viewpoints from neuroscience, but the same logic could also downplay their 
arguments.  
63 
 
In sum, there was overwhelming public and academic evidence that people desire a change 
from the contemporary expert systems that assist the court. Evidence suggests that the 
principle of medicine will fall, and that the court will likely be assisted by a broader academic 
competence. However, it has not been made clear if this will include expertise from other 
professions than psychiatry and psychology. Legislation will most likely be changed in order 
to accommodate these changes. 
Throughout the analysis, several professional dilemmas that face forensic psychiatry were 
made apparent. Based on the evidence for these, here are the main findings:  
1. The principle of medicine proven an obstacle likely to be out-phased. 
2. Crucial aspects of the criticism against forensic psychiatry are not convincingly 
addressed; likely cause is ongoing professional power struggles. 
3. The language of psychiatry is losing its explanatory power; the conception of   
accountability must be redefined. 
4. Public trust in expert opinions has decreased  
5. Clear indications of a coming paradigm shift towards an inclusion of a broader 
academic competence in court. 
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Chapter 5  
Discussion  
 
Pre-Breivik Norwegian society is often depicted as a peaceful, liberal and open democracy, 
with an ideology that praises transparent politics and active cooperation between the private, 
professional and public sphere. The terror attacks on 22/7, and the extensive media coverage 
of its legal aftermath, changed our outlook on the judicial system. Until then, the professional 
discipline of forensic psychiatry had more or less performed their duties unnoticed behind 
closed doors, and its mechanics were widely unknown. Suddenly, everybody had an opinion, 
forensic psychiatry was scrutinised and experts were forced on their knees to explain their 
secrets about how they work, and how they define psychosis as the border between normality 
and unaccountability.  
The consequence became as clear as it was brutal; general trust in expert opinions weakened, 
moral and ethical questions never asked before confronted the knowledge we take for granted, 
and awakened a public need for a complete revaluation not only of Breivik, but also of crucial 
aspects related to our legal system and expertise. Shocking facts were discovered about the 
inconsistency and inadequacy of expert work and the ongoing professional power struggles, 
and the public image of (forensic) psychiatry soon resembled that of glass shattered into 
pieces. In hindsight and reflection, some of the shards may signify illegitimate power 
constellations and deceitful truths, which were hidden from plain sight, and once revealed, 
may possibly never be pieced together again. 
 
5.1 The principle of medicine and statutory law 
In reference to the analysis, many speakers wished to change the laws that involve the 
principle of medicine. The principle is pointed out as the most visible link to the existing 
system of forensic psychiatry, and the laws based on it assert the roles psychiatrists (and 
sometimes psychologists) play in this practice. The laws or their wording must change in 
order to accommodate a broader academic competence in future court, and much indicates 
that to instead follow the principle of psychology, is a suitable option. Thorvik (2012, my 
translation) suggested that the law instead read “He or she, who is not capable to comprehend 
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guilt, shall not be punished.” This, he reckons, promotes a wide array of approaches, and not 
only from psychiatry or psychology. 
According to the evidence that supports this issue, statements from psychiatry’s own 
headquarters read “Abolish the principle of medicine” (Skre & Hansen 2012), together with 
similar voices from other fields of expertise. As pointed out in the analysis through Bourdieu 
(1988) and Foucault (1991), a possible reason for why psychiatric spokespersons shape their 
arguments in such a way, is that their position as “top dog” is threatened, and they thus 
respond by attacking their own discipline to reorganize both social position and power 
relations. It would otherwise seem strange why they should undermine their own position in 
court without putting up a fight. As they argue that such changes may lead to better legal 
protection for the perpetrator and society, it is a viable thought, but it is also perhaps naïve 
given the circumstances of other criticism. My interpretation is that psychiatrists are aware of 
the change that will come, and particularly in reference to Grøndahl et al. (2012), want to be 
first out to define on what new platform the reform should be placed. This shows both a 
power struggle, to sustain or reorganise power, and a play for the public to regain trust. 
However, the tactics they may have employed to promote their arguments, also emit signs of 
possible professional inadequacy and a lack of insight. If this lack of transparency and 
communication between the two main pillars of the judicial hierarchy really have such 
shortcomings, then I do not believe the battle is won simply by abolishing the principle of 
medicine. As much as a big part of my evidence scrutinizes the practice of forensic 
psychiatry, I find it a paradox that so few fingers have been raised at the actual head of the 
judicial branch or government. No evidence is also evidence, and it is therefore interesting 
that some voices were less active in the public debate. 
If the blinds are opened and the head is lifted, we may review the outcome of a transfer to 
alternative principles, and objectivity when choosing experts to fill the roles will be essential. 
According to a Habermasian (2006) view, one would have to strive for communicative action, 
where contestants converse on equal grounds, to achieve this. Through the mind-set of 
Mercier and Sperber (2010), the inclusion of many participants would possibly get rid of the 
confirmation biases, and by that discover where the balance of the judicial crib should be 
placed. In a Kompridian (2006) manner, we should not rest until every stone is turned in order 
to get rid of old and useless practices, and by the many inputs be able to refocus on new 
possible solutions previously untried.  
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Compared with the research of Bourdieu (1988) and Foucault (1991), the ideology behind the 
principle of medicine dates back hundreds of years. The institutions of medicine and law have 
gone hand in hand ever since psychotic abnormalities were defined as a mental illness, and 
since it became a perceived threat to society. Through the ages, leading professional 
discourses have convinced the public that these experts are capable of treating the mad and 
unaccountable within the legal system, under the guise of contributing to the greater good. 
Bourdieu and Foucault have shed light on the mechanisms of power that reproduce these 
power relations within the academic system, and how knowledge, titles and positions confer 
authority as banks of symbolic capital. However, they have also shown that their discipline is 
made possible through acts of symbolic violence, and that psychiatric expertise does not 
necessarily solve any underlying social problems, neither those related to crime. Such a view 
raises doubts about the principle of medicine. 
Internationally, Norwegian ideology has become a symbol of high moral and ethical 
standards, and this is reflected more or less throughout each level of society. In modern 
democratic societies like this, people usually have access to more information, and are thus in 
a better position to evaluate the authenticity of expert work and authorities. In the case of 
forensic psychiatry, it may be said that the public showed little interest until the terror attacks 
of Breivik were launched. In that context, the attacks can be viewed as a revelation.  
On the other hand, much indicates that the expert systems have strategically withheld 
information in order to retain their prominent position in society, which could be one 
explanation for the lack of public interest. Nonetheless, the principle of medicine, once 
analysed, stands as a symbol of a past where authority and knowledge was not necessarily 
based on merits or truth. The question arises whether other fields of expertise are similarly 
based on unsteady ground. Countries we often like comparing ourselves with, such as 
Denmark and Sweden, have already moved away from this principle, and have adopted a 
mixed or psychological principle with seeming success. Why has Norway clung onto the 
principle of medicine?  
Spokespersons from forensic psychiatry struggle in many instances to justify their claims of 
validity, likely because they are based on the principle of medicine. Habermas (2006) points 
out that truth may only be pursued through objective argumentative circumstances, which 
reasoning on behalf of this principle does not help. Through the public debate, various 
suggestions for moving away from this principle were voiced, and simply because of the array 
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of competing arguments, there is a greater chance of producing desirable results. In the view 
of Mercier and Sperber (2010), this setting also reduces the confirmation bias. Since the 
academic field of forensic psychiatry was unexpectedly under a lot of pressure, their 
defensive stance may explain why particularly some of the first arguments were stern, 
conservative and showed little interest in incorporating criticism. However, accepted 
knowledge relies on if the majority supports it, and hence the concept “truth” is relative to 
such circumstances – and hence in the same logic, the production of knowledge does not 
guarantee truth. One may thus consider traditional psychiatric expertise and worldview to be 
subject to the same criteria as Breivik; both parties front views that are not shared by the 
public, but are exchanged within circles of associates who share the same type of symbolic 
capital.  
Kompridis (2006) expresses the importance to re-think scenarios and make something that 
was previously unintelligible, intelligible. This thought-process can be compared to the 
direction that the public debate has taken, but it can also be extended. What if the diagnose 
psychosis eventually becomes replaced, in the same manner female hysteria no longer is 
regarded as legitimate. If this occurs, neither the medicinal nor the psychological principle 
appear to capture the relationship between our brain and criminal deviance. In such a 
scenario, surely other academic disciplines should play a larger role in deciding a causal 
relationship leading up to the criminal act.  
 
5.2 Professional power struggles 
Professional power struggles were described as a dominating and highly visible part of the 
public debate, in which Stanghelle (2012) dubs it Norwegian championship in psychiatry”. 
There is reason to believe that throughout history, most fields of expertise continuously 
compete for power, which can be seen as an important element of adaptation and evolvement. 
However, in Norwegian society competitiveness is a feature most commonly not associated 
with the traditional institutions of forensic psychiatry and law, as they can be described as 
solid institutions entrusted with power for consistently handling issues of public interest. 
Forensic psychiatrists are expected to have knowledge on mental illness, perform their duties 
required by law, protect society and individuals by their application of knowledge, rehabilitate 
psychotic offenders and go about it in a professional way. When the public bear witness to 
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power struggles of this magnitude, the focus shifts to their unprofessional conduct and raises 
doubts about the overall worth of expert opinions and expertise.  
Frequently, the professional parties involved in the debate argued on a macro level. In this 
setting, the fact that psychiatric expertise has a clear consequence for how individuals are 
treated in court, was often ignored by some representatives from the field who were 
apparently more interested in discussing matters of prestige and legitimacy, and instead 
discussed whose opinion was worth addressing or not. Kringlen (cited in Gjerdåker 2012) 
stated, “Journalists, authors, historians, and other experts without a background in medicine or 
psychology have a pre-determined view on the evaluation”.  
In his view, I interpret professional titles and academic affiliation as the ultimate proof of 
legitimacy, in a desperate attempt to reinforce the status of his own specialty, when in theory 
someone with the title of Journalist should not necessarily be any less right than the Nestor 
and Professor Emeritus of psychiatry. Bourdieu (1988) describes how to defend certain types 
of knowledge from intrusion is common practice within academia, and that holders of 
prominent titles such as Kringlen may be viewed as an elitist and statutory authority within 
the hierarchy of his faculty, because of the amount of social and symbolic power invested in 
him. In light of Mercier and Sperber (2010), his arguments appear highly influenced by the 
confirmation bias, in particular because of the clear avoidance to address competing 
arguments.     
Other spokespersons for the discipline of psychiatry held a more dynamic approach as they 
appeared to have incorporated part of the criticism, and fashioned their arguments in a way 
that suggested change in a positive direction. Repeatedly, the politicians were referred to as 
holders of real power and initiative to instate changes into the system. While this may be a 
fact, the view of Bourdieu (1988) and Foucault (1991) suggests that the social positions 
within these institutions are intertwined to such a degree that they exercise power across the 
whole field. This means, that we are misguided to believe psychiatrists hold no real power, 
because their opinions are highly influential in steering the discourses in desired directions. 
Once again, this can be related to the language of psychiatry and its implementation in the 
principle of medicine. 
Overall, the public discourse on forensic psychiatry suggests that the academic discipline is 
not a unified group of specialists, but is more easily compared to several factions who hold 
different beliefs. In a Bourdieuian (1988) perspective, this has a negative effect in the sense 
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that authorities avoid states of disarray, and thus need homogeneity, unity and consensus to 
maintain the status quo of their operations. In a Habermasian (2006), Mercierian and 
Sperberian (2010) perspective, we may see this development as positive in the sense that a 
multitude of authorities have come together to discuss the outcome of the Breivik-scenario, 
which also includes the “layman” opinion that asserted influence both on the court trial and on 
the assessment of valid expertise. The media have played a major role in the creation of an 
arena where these diverse discussions could take place, and such arenas reduce the impact of 
biased argumentation. In Kompridian (1991) thought, this arena also allows a point of 
departure where we may expand the space of possibility for a change of the existing expert 
systems, and even attempt previously un-thought and un-tried solutions.  
 
5.3 The language of psychiatry; conception of accountability 
A core issue that concerns our conception of accountability is how its legislative wording is 
solely written in a language created by psychiatry. Inherently, this means that psychiatric 
knowledge is the sole explanatory factor we may refer to, to explain the coherence between 
the health of our brain and criminal acts. As much of the criticism has pointed out, it is not 
obvious why psychosis should exempt a person from responsibility in the eyes of the law. 
Moreover, it is not obvious why a person should be diagnosed as psychotic in the first place, 
given the sheer dichotomous and categorical nature of both DSM-IV and the law. Vogt (2012, 
my translation) cited:  
“Diagnoses are not diseases, but linguistic units whose function are to describe what is 
considered to be sick. Diagnoses are not something that people ‘have’ or ‘are’; they 
are simply written in a book. Diagnoses change when the diagnostic manuals change, 
and humans are like landscapes in constant change and without set borders – where 
diagnostics are like a static map with borders. Maps are useful, but they are a hinder 
for orientation if one does not lift one’s eyes.” 
This challenges our conception and common belief in insanity, as well as the definition of 
normality and the validity of psychiatry. Through this line of thought, psychiatry has had the 
power to define our understanding of this aspect of the social world, and until now, it has 
mostly been taken for granted. In reference to the first mental evaluation of Breivik, the 
appointed specialists gave him the score of two on the GAF-scale, which is normally assigned 
to a person who barely functions in any kind of context. Because Breivik de facto functions 
like most others in society, their decision is a paradox. This can thus be seen as a breach of 
psychiatric protocol and as an unorthodox utilization of the GAF-scale. In the words of Vogt 
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(2012, my translation), “Internationally, the public debate sees forensic psychiatry as crawling 
from one ditch to another, from mindless speculation to checklist monomania.” 
Lindstrøm (2012) pointed to how deconstructing the wording of DSM-IV showed that the 
legitimation of defining psychosis rested on who held the majority vote and opinion on the 
matter, a practice that at the best could be seen as speculative and biased. Foucault (1991) 
showed that to diagnose, treat or punish deviants or criminally insane, more often than not 
were actions of control, or ways to get rid of unwanted elements that could pose as a threat to 
existing power structures. It seems evident, that to have the diagnostic handbook as main 
guide and framework, fails to aid their claims of validity. The handbook does not only need 
translation, but also needs to be reinterpreted and carefully analysed as to see if any hidden 
power structures of symbolic violence gave rise to its list of diagnoses.  
Foucault (1991) sees the insane person’s communication with their surroundings as solely 
conveyed by a reason that is just as abstract for them – order, physical and moral compulsion, 
anonymous group pressure and conformity demands. This could just as well be a description 
of Breivik and his alternative worldview, as opposed to his encounter with the treatment by 
professional and public opinion throughout the scenario. Foucault explains how language 
plays a key part in the domination-technique of exploitation and misleading, and this may 
have been active tools for both Breivik’s rhetoric and the professionals’. In reference to 
Lindstrøm (2012), the definition of psychosis rests on the legitimacy of a subject’s worldview, 
based on if the majority supports such a view. Psychosis is thus relative to the societal 
context, which renders the definition of accountability in §44 (Straffeloven 2005) speculative. 
Much of the evidence portrayed in the analysis points to that the language of psychiatry is 
outdated. Contemporary research, adaptive technology and diverse means for communication, 
as always evolve at great speed, while the psychiatric handbook almost seems so “out of 
sync” that its language is incomprehensible. In Habermasian (2006) thought, this would be 
more a hindrance to create an ideal speech situation, than a tool for reaching fair and unbiased 
verdicts that advice the court. Can this be blamed on the lack of competence in specialist 
education, the lack of schools, the lack of DRK’s quality control and guidelines for conduct, 
and the lack of faith and trust in opposing beliefs from other academic fields, that post other 
views than those taken for granted?   
Compared to some narrow-mindedness witnessed in the public debate, it makes you wonder 
why there is seemingly so little space for reflection and more holistic thinking. A black and 
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white picture from forensic psychiatry is a sharp contrast to the colourfulness of Norwegian 
society! Language and discourse affects our interpretation of the world, but is not static. It can 
be compared to a living organism, which is kept alive by communication. If there is no 
communication, a language will vitrify and die. As for the long uncontested time in office for 
the language of psychiatry, what we may witness in the public debate is its death, unless 
psychiatry picks up the spirit to communicate back in a language we understand. In reference 
to this metaphor and Foucault (1991), the language of the “mad” may be revived if it is not 
already dead.     
Comparative linguistics is a discipline often referred to by other disciplines, to study how 
language through communicative actions will adapt to the given field or society, and how it 
borrows and lends from its parts to adapt and develop further. As an example, the evidence in 
the analysis shows that only a small part of the speakers connected their arguments to why 
Sweden and Denmark changed their forensic psychiatric approach, let alone how they 
switched over. Why was this context barely touched and given such small weight by the panel 
of voices apparent in the analysis? If we look for answers in the viewpoint of Kringlen (cited 
in Gjerdåker 2012), perhaps Swedish and Danish knowledge is simply perceived as a threat. 
In addition, my evidence shows that antiquated rules for conduct, whether from the forensic 
psychiatrists or DRK, lead to inadequate procedures for communication between the soliciting 
parts. The validity of this form of expertise can clearly be of concern for the outcome of a fair 
verdict. The lack of in-depth reflection on various communicative aspects, such as biased 
language, the lack of language, leading questions, (strategic) ignorance, de-contextualised 
answers and not least the handbook used as a bible for the one and only truth, paves way for 
unjust and biased uncommunicative action. When speakers like Lindstrøm (2012) reveal such 
obvious weaknesses, the scenario can ironically be compared with the boy who pointed out 
that the Emperor wore no clothes. 
The study has so far provided means to reflect upon psychiatric language and its limitations, 
and we may thus through the communicative schema of Kompridis (2006) revert our mode of 
thought. What if §44 of the criminal code was written in an unaffiliated way or composed of 
several languages to accommodate a broader academic competence, so the diagnostic 
language of psychiatry does not dominate the discourse? Do we need a border set between 
psychosis and criminal deviance at all? What is the language of the mad?  
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According to Foucault (1991), the language of the mad is non-existent in contemporary 
society. So long as psychiatry holds the right to define madness as a disease of the mind, it 
will remain supressed. He states that this act of symbolic violence occurred already in the 18th 
century – and where are we today? Where should we look for an answer? Who can provide 
the court with clear answers, when according to Stanghelle (2012) the advice given by 
appointed forensic psychiatrists is unclear? As Foucault claims, the only way the language of 
psychiatry, which is reason’s monologue over insanity, can exists, is purely by exercising 
symbolic violence and suppression over the forgotten and silenced.  
If spokespersons from psychiatry acknowledge this, the very aspect of the missing link in 
psychiatry’s vocabulary can prove to be a dilemma, which if not seriously and professionally 
dealt with, no doubt will add nails to their coffin. There are many willing to bear the coffin, 
such as Lindstrøm (2012) who asks, “Where is the limit between normal-extremist nonsense 
and psychotic delusion?” Should we ask, “Is psychiatry’s language based on reality, and if so, 
whose reality?” In light of the debate on the relationship between psychosis and an unrealistic 
worldview, perhaps we can think of psychiatry as a social entity, and conduct mental 
evaluations of it. 
My evidence shows that the psychiatric evaluations of Breivik, and the aftermath coloured by 
the many public opinions, have been an ideal stepping-stone to call out the long overdue need 
for a paradigm shift of language control. In an eventual future transition, the unintelligible 
psychiatric conversation partner will have to abdicate, in order to join a linguistic revolution, 
where the laymen and experts together front a new discourse of communicative action. This 
simply shows the important role language and discourse plays in everyday life, and that it 
may have big political consequences. Stanghelle (2012) relates to these issues, and claims that 
until they are resolved, the court case cannot serve as one of the most important milestones, 
on the road where we can move on as a society. 
Foucault (1991) showed through his research that there are plentiful discursive traces left in 
the past that provide an insight to how psychiatric language has dominated those deemed 
mentally ill and other kinds of social deviants. In an egalitarian society like Norway, most 
believe in social equality, and thus signs that psychiatry plays a dominant and symbolic 
violent part in the legal system will necessarily have to be dealt with. In a Habermasian 
(2006) and Mercierian and Sperberian (2010) perspective, the conditions for an improvement 
of the system has been made possible, now that the elevated status of psychiatric language has 
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diminished and other viewpoints contest it. Foucault described the world of the mentally ill as 
calm and silenced. Perhaps another public debate should include the voices of those who are 
actually termed psychotic, and the “borderline psychotics”, because their viewpoint appears to 
be the only ones missing in the post-22/7 discussion.   
 
5.4 Public trust 
The disagreement between the parties involved in the public debate may be the main reason 
why many expressed a weakened sense of public trust in experts. As Bourdieu (1988) 
explained, authorities cannot present themselves in a state of disarray without compromising 
their professional legitimacy. Moreover, experts rely on public trust in the sense that their 
social power stems from symbolic capital, which relies on consensus that their specific 
knowledge is useful and applicable. According to Bourdieu, academic systems such as 
psychiatry have their own defence mechanisms that reproduce power relations and social 
standing within their hierarchical structures and in a prestigious nature bestows its capital unto 
colleagues with elite titles and technical competence guaranteed by law. It seems ironic that 
their entire elitist structure crumbles once the public gain access to its knowledge, and once 
arguments from other experts are able to disrupt their academic discourse. In that context, 
public mistrust is well founded. If a rigid structure like psychiatry is so easily weakened, the 
worth of their knowledge appears all the less useful and legitimate. 
Generally, most attention in the public debate was given to the professional discipline of 
forensic psychiatry and the academic field of psychiatry. However, the impact suffered on 
their behalf can be interpreted as the initiation of a domino effect for other expert systems. In 
an open democracy like Norway, with freedom of speech, transparency and openness 
becomes a key virtue for any profession or organisation. We are thus suspicious of closed 
expert systems, because it goes against the principles of the nation.  
Interestingly, people showed little interest in forensic psychiatry before 22/7. Tørrissen (2012) 
stated that his field of expertise was widely unknown before the first mental evaluation was 
completed, and perhaps public interest thus grew when the report was leaked to the press. 
Zahid (2011) claimed that it was the scale and brutality of the case that caught our attention, 
and reckoned that people would not care that much if Breivik had killed only one person. He 
might have a good point, but if so, why do people first start caring when an issue becomes 
addressed through the mass media? A possible explanation is because the Norwegian 
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population mostly has high levels of welfare, sense of economic security and social equality. 
Such conditions may lead to laziness, ignorance and indifference to what goes on in the 
surroundings, so long as it does not directly affect them. After all, the procedures of forensic 
psychiatry does not affect many people, but for those concerned, it has big consequences.  
Nonetheless, it highlights that the Norwegian media, also commonly referred to as the fourth 
estate, have immense power to reveal issues of public concern, even when the public is not by 
default willing to address it. Thus, the media function as investigative eye-openers, which also 
have the power to support their claims by providing the public with an arena for dialogue with 
experts. A Mercierian and Sperberian (2010) perspective highlights the value and need for 
arguments and counter-arguments, otherwise discourses such as the one conveyed by 
psychiatry, may be biased.  
Compared to Habermas’s (2006) schema for rational argumentation and communicative 
action, Norwegians in theory thus have excellent conditions for affecting high-level decisions, 
and to challenge taken for granted knowledge, but only when it suits them. The media abides 
to the principle of freedom of speech, and even though this promotes equality and 
independence, the genuine power of the media may be abused from time to time – especially 
in nations that have a government-controlled press. This is important to consider, when basing 
ones assumptions on information relayed through these channels. 
Maybe the lack of disagreement with psychiatric opinion kept the system online for hundreds 
of years. Foucault (1991) explained how psychiatry created the language of mental illness, 
and that its legitimacy depended on constraining the voices of the mad. According to him, 
when it joined forces with the judiciary, psychiatric competence was confirmed by legislation 
and its status promoted. As alternative voices attempt to comprehend the definition of 
madness and its language, psychiatry’s dominance gradually diminishes. In the context of the 
Breivik-trial, the media made it possible, and psychiatric evaluations were thus given less 
weight on court decisions. Arntzen (cited in Peters 2013) stated that disagreement was 
common in the courts of law, and that it was merely positive for producing a good conclusion. 
She used the same statement to claim that the discipline of forensic psychiatry was not facing 
a crisis.  
Conversely, if (forensic) psychiatric knowledge and practice were by this time common 
information and its usage justifiably applicable and without dubious origins and affiliation, 
there would likely be no major disagreement in the public debate. The point is that 
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disagreement expands the space of possibilities and enables development in a positive 
direction, and is hence useful. Arntzen (cited in Peters 2013) is thus correct in her 
interpretation of disagreement, but the specific large-scale disagreement in the public debate 
was undoubtedly linked to a crisis of legitimacy within psychiatric circles. There would not be 
an issue if the public and other experts had trusted the two mental evaluations of Breivik, and 
gained credence to the validity of their approach in forensics. More credence equals in this 
context less disagreement, and hence in such a setting, disagreement in the Breivik 
evaluations could have been a virtue and not a professional dilemma. Positively speaking, 
disagreement may very well be what is needed to provide durable experts, whose knowledge 
is more dynamic and valid, compared to conservative psychiatric expertise.   
 
5.5 Paradigm shift 
As forensic psychiatry was brought into the light, people saw the need to include a broader 
academic competence in court. As indicated in the analysis, the contemporary system must 
change to either simply incorporate a mixed or psychological principle, or to include experts 
from alternative academic disciplines other than psychiatry and psychology. The latter may 
include a larger role for sociologists, philosophers, neuroscientists, historians and so forth. 
There is no lack of experts; just no fixed answer to which experts may be suited for providing 
us with a satisfactory understanding of accountability. Even if we arrive at an answer, it will 
be relative to new knowledge we are confronted with in the future that might initiate another 
paradigm shift.  
In that context, a paradigm shift can colloquially be referred to as a structured form of 
Zeitgeist. In comparison, Foucault (1991) mentioned the Zeitgeist of the classical age, where 
mass-incarceration was initiated by a public need to deal with poverty, economic problems, 
crime, unemployment and vagrancy. These were key features that concerned the treatment of 
social deviants, as well as providing a moral obligation to do so. The same public needs are 
topical today, but they mostly do not concern psychiatric treatment. When compared to 
Foucault’s research, this is not surprising, because psychiatric treatment of the mad never 
solved any underlying social problems. 
If psychiatry was designed to deal with these needs in the past, it brings about questions of its 
usefulness in contemporary society. According to Bourdieu (1988), the higher disciplines 
depend on controlling customary practice, and produce knowledge and authority. In light of 
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the post-22/7-debate, they are not in control of neither of these, at least not when compared to 
pre-22/7. Forensic psychiatrists have a technical competence, which is guaranteed by a law 
that will likely be changed in the near future. In fact, the very foundation of the academic 
discipline has been challenged, and all these issues can help avoid what Bourdieu refers to as 
“social determinism” by established institutions.  
Contributions to the public debate from the academic discipline of neuroscience had 
interesting points related to the validity of forensic psychiatric work. According to Eagleman 
(cited in Time 2011), neuroscience will make it possible to utilize evidence, rather than bad 
intuition when we shape out politics. This principles of their discipline dismantles the 
principles related to psychiatry, but an implementation of neuroscience in forensics may bring 
about other crucial questions that should be discussed, such as: Will we face a future scenario 
where people are sentenced by machines, and where people can be “proven” criminal by brain 
scans even before they have committed a criminal act? Can a test of amniotic fluid show a 
prenatal criminal, and will it hence solicit lawful abortions? 
Stålsett claimed that Breivik is a sign of the times and that the language of psychiatry is not 
comprised of the right elements to describe the existential aspects of him. The inadequacy of 
their language appears to be confirmed by various other sources, but according to Eagleman 
(cited in Time 2011); Breivik is not a sign of the times. In his perspective, the responsibility 
for Breivik’s acts of terror does not lie in his sick mind, or society at large; but in his 
susceptibility to input from societies that he was a part of – namely groups of people typically 
described as extreme right wing, nationalistic, islamophobic and militant. From this, we can 
deduct the following; public arenas for political discussions can be regarded as micro-
societies with immense power of influence. The ones Breivik was associated with, typically 
convey one-sided information, are anti-government and not interested to accommodate other 
viewpoints. This can be understood as an ideology set out to oppose mainstream Norwegian 
ideology. In light of Habermas (2006), its predetermined goals cannot fit into the schema of 
communicative action. 
Bourdieu (1988) elaborates on the reproductive power of academia. Like-minded persons to 
Breivik are commonly not included in academic circles affiliated with Norwegian 
government, but since the social field where they interact (through for instance online 
communication and separate social hierarchies) may be considered independent micro-
societies, and thus may use similar tactics as they proactively affirm their beliefs, status and 
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prestige through (symbolic) acts of violence. Without active input from counter-arguments, 
what Mercier and Sperber (2010) refer to as the confirmation bias, will continue to reaffirm 
and strengthen such attitudes. Following, an interdisciplinary expert from for instance 
sociology or psychology, with a specialty in right-wing ideologies, would likely be able to 
contribute greatly to this argument in light of the evaluation of Breivik, to understand what 
“created” him.   
Skjeldal (2012b) proved that numerous alternative disciplines could shed light on the 
evaluations of the first report from Breivik’s evaluation, and contribute to a broader 
understanding of his mental circumstances. There is no reason to believe that it would 
negatively affect the quality of specialist reports produced for the court. However, it will be a 
challenge to determine who should be given the privilege to conduct such advisory work. 
Perhaps we can compare the scenario to coalition governments, where a certain amount of 
representatives from each political party is voted into council and ministerial seats. Such a 
system is not necessarily optimal, but it ensures that different voices are heard. Moreover, it 
fulfils central aspects of what Habermas (2006) describes as criteria for pursuing 
communicative action. In light of Mercier and Sperber (2010), the confirmation bias will 
likely be cancelled out by the probable outcome of arguments and viewpoints that contradict 
each other.  
 
5.5.1 “The layman principle” 
Inspired by Kompridis (2006), Mercier and Sperber (2010) I imagined a future 
interdisciplinary congregation of experts in a joint review panel, who have specialised 
education and training for forensic work. These people are voted in for a certain amount of 
years, and are tasked with assisting the court on difficult cases that challenge our 
comprehension of causality, psyche and crime, such as the Breivik-case. In Norwegian 
District Court, the judge is often assisted by lay judges. These are randomly appointed people, 
who are typically given a crash course on law, but whose function is to let the defendant be 
judged by equals. This is seen as a guarantee for legal protection. 
Part of the public criticism of forensic psychiatrists, was directed towards their relationship 
with the court, because they had too much power and influence on court decision. Hence, they 
may be seen as an extension of the legal system. If lay judges ensure legal protection from the 
judges, then “lay experts” may ensure legal protection from the joint review panel. Moreover, 
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if the lay experts were specifically tasked with disagreeing with the conclusions, he or she 
would stand a chance to explore untried routes and produce results that forced the other 
experts to review their conclusions. A layman conclusion would necessarily be authorised as 
legitimate if supported by the majority of the panel. In line with the theorists of inspiration, 
this should provide an ideal point of departure to pursue communicative action, expand the 
space of possibilities and cancel out the negative effects of the confirmation bias. 
Additionally, there is a good chance that such a panel composition may reduce the negative 
effects of “heavy expertise”, which in cognitive studies are commonly associated with 
simplification and automation of knowledge (Madsen 1999). 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
The academic discipline of forensic psychiatry faces several professional dilemmas of great 
topical interest, as a result of the failure to convincingly depict and comprehend the 
complexities of Breivik through two separate mental evaluations. Because of the intricate 
relationship between psychiatric language and legislation, court decisions are strongly 
influenced by forensic psychiatric expertise. It is likely that the language of psychiatry may no 
longer hold a monopoly to define mental abnormalities in relation to criminal deviance. The 
public debate clearly indicates professional power struggles between the field of psychiatry 
and opponents. Public opinion points to distrust in experts and the legal system, which 
thereby compromises the foundation of legal security, conception of accountability and 
principles of transparency in an open democratic society. Strong indications suggest that a 
broader academic competence will assist the court in forensics in the near future as we 
approach a paradigm shift. The whole scenario would not be possible without media coverage 
and public opinion. 
 
6.1 22/7 Hindsight 
Based on the developments through the Breivik-scenario, we need to be wary of truths we 
take for granted and be cautious of whom to trust. Academic education is important for 
specialisation, but also a problematic term, as it may be closely tied to the indoctrination of 
one particular type of knowledge or symbolic capital. In a perfectly transparent society there 
would be no need for an analysis of power structures, but as this case has shown such 
analyses may lead to uncover aspects that are vulnerable to public exposure. As the 
complexities of Breivik have not been fully comprehended, the question remains, what causal 
relationship is there between this individual and his criminal actions? The question is not only 
relevant for a closure of the terror attacks, but also to understand what characteristics of the 
brain, society or ideology create what Habermas would define as highly uncommunicative 
action.  
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6.2 Critical reflection of this study 
Selected discourses from the public debate on forensic psychiatry were analysed and 
discussed according to a specific theoretical frame of reference, to shed light on the mental 
evaluations of Breivik and to find evidence that the academic discipline faces professional 
dilemmas. Issues of societal significance, discursive aspects and impact on social structures 
were tied to the speech setting. Each contribution gave valuable insight to the speaker and his 
or her social context, but it is important to acknowledge that different interpreters may arrive 
at different conclusions than I. With respect to the contextual aspects of this study, the study 
itself can be viewed as a composition of several arguments, intended to enlighten the recipient 
convincingly on problematic themes related to forensic psychiatry. The study is thus a 
contribution to the overall discussion, and should accordingly be subject to careful 
examination.  
In reference to Habermas (2006), each party in a speech scenario must have equal ground to 
front their views, to promote communicative action. My main findings and the discussion is 
based on a finite number of sources, which only represent a section of the public debate as 
whole, and may thereby only be proof of general tendencies within the discourses. 
Additionally, these written sources do not necessarily accurately depict views held by the 
speakers. Nonetheless, the fact that they are publically available means that anyone can read 
and interpret, and they may thus influence a large audience. As such, the written sources 
convey elements of social power and argumentation in themselves, which is also true for this 
study. 
 
6.3 Implications for expert systems 
In our conception and interpretation of the world, there will always be unanswered questions. 
As history has shown, science progresses and ultimately leads to a transformation of the way 
we think and of how we develop our society. This study was mainly concerned with 
Norwegian forensic psychiatry in relation to the Breivik-case, but the philosophical aspects of 
argumentation and trusting authorities are transmissible to a more general understanding of 
the mechanics of expert systems and power constellations. Expert systems are able to provide 
us with information designed in a language of their programming. We use this information to 
categorise, hierarchize and often to dichotomously label artefacts, entities and actions – a 
cognition process that is part of our daily life, and which helps us efficiently make sense of 
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the world. We depend on cognition, simply because we hardly function without. Hence, the 
language of the information we base our cognition on plays a major role and should not be 
ignored.  
In reference to Foucault (1991), whomever produces the knowledge we confide in asserts 
immense power of social control and censorship through their discourse. Importantly, the 
concept “truth” is thus relative to the currently most accurate definition of something, and it 
should not be treated otherwise. In our modern age, with information readily available by the 
press of a button, we may learn new things every day, but in doing so, we may also unlearn 
knowledge we have previously taken for granted – if we are willing to revert our mode of 
thought. In the jungle of information, there has never been a guarantee for truth, and to be 
critical of sources is hence the best way to go about. To quote Vogt (2012), we must never 
stop asking why. 
 
6.4 Further research 
To analyze the legitimacy of other parts of psychiatric expertise would be interesting, since 
DSM-IV contains definitions of various other diseases of the brain and because psychiatry has 
a widespread application, and is not only restricted to forensic settings. I am also curious as to 
what main differences exist between the interpretation of the brain made by psychiatrists and 
neuroscientists, and as the latter claim, their knowledge is rapidly increasing.  It could also be 
enlightening to examine public discourses and compare what Bourdieu (1988) terms higher 
and lower disciplines, to see if there are marked differences in the way they portray 
arguments. This could perhaps best be done through a thorough, word-by-word discourse 
analysis. To shed further light on the criticism portrayed here, a comparative study could be 
conducted between Sweden, Denmark and Norway to test the grounds of the mixed or 
psychological principle. Finally, the analysis showed some links between the institution of 
Christianity and psychiatry, which is also evident in Foucault’s (1991) research. A similar 
power analysis could thus illuminate a conception of religious institutions as expert systems 
that confer social influence. 
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